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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DEFAULT RISK, CREDIT MARKET LIQUIDITY, AND CORPORATE EVENTS 
 
Thomas D. Shohfi, Ph.D. 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2015 
 
 
Prior literature examining bond excess returns around corporate events assumes that 
creditor wealth effects are driven by changes in the default risk of the firm.  I revisit these 
bond event studies using data from 2002 through 2014, explore intra-firm individual bond 
reactions, and refine the analyses using changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads.  
CDS spreads (price-weighted firm aggregate cash bond prices) show small increases (large 
increases) in default risk of acquiring firms, no change (large increases) for common equity 
repurchasing firms, and large decreases (no change) for seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
firms.  I isolate liquidity effects around these events by examining changes in the CDS-
bond basis and contrast with introduction of the “basis credit ratio” (BCR) comparing 
basis to cash bond spread changes.  Firm aggregate median BCRs show variation in the 
CDS-bond basis contributes between 50.8% and 69.6% of changes in bond spreads, 
suggesting that credit market liquidity risk around these corporate events is economically 
large relative to default risk. 
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1 Introduction 
Firm managers frequently make decisions to engage in corporate transactions which 
influence the asset composition, leverage, and risk profile of the firm.  The economic 
magnitude of these events is simply enormous.  According to SDC, from 2002 through 
2014, public firms proposed acquisitions, common share repurchases announcements, and 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) within the United States that represent a total equity 
transaction value in excess of $12.2 trillion.  While these corporate events immediately 
influence shareholders, potential effects and wealth interactions with equity can also 
manifest in the debt securities of the transacting firm.  For instance, Billett, King, and 
Mauer (2004) find that acquirer bonds generally experience negative returns.  Maxwell 
and Stephens (2003) document similar negative results for firms announcing common 
equity repurchases, while Eberhart and Siddique (2002) show positive returns to 
bondholders in months during seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).  These prior studies 
assume that excess returns to bondholders are driven by a change in default risk due to 
the event: Maxwell and Stephens (2003) state that “if there is truly a wealth transfer from 
bondholders to shareholders, it must be due to an increased probability of default on the 
bonds.”  Similarly, Eberhart and Siddique (2002) note that “an SEO should benefit a 
firm’s bondholders at the expense of its shareholders, ceteris paribus, because an SEO 
reduces the firm’s default risk.” 
In frictionless markets, there would be no need to distinguish default and non-default 
components of returns to creditors around corporate events.  Relaxing this unrealistic 
assumption, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) note that the distinction between default 
risk and other factors is “of key importance from a corporate finance perspective because 
the presence of non-default components in corporate spreads could directly affect capital 
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structure decisions as well as the timing of debt and equity issuances.” More precise 
measurement of changes in default risk around acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs 
provides investors and firm managers with the direct consequences of these events to 
creditors unobscured by liquidity and other non-default factors.  
There are several important reasons why prior bond event studies may fail to 
accurately capture changes in default risk.  The first is methodological: many prior 
corporate bond event studies use only monthly return data, increasing the probability 
that returns are influenced by information unrelated to the event being examined.  This 
use of monthly bond returns can lead to biased results, as documented by Bessembinder, 
Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009).  The use of corporate credit rating changes around 
corporate events is also problematic.  Credit ratings are intentionally slow moving, lag 
behind information reflected in credit markets, and are biased by rating agency conflict of 
interest and analyst subjectivity. 
The second reason relates to shortcomings of the cash bond market and subsequent 
evolution in the pricing of credit.  Specifically, supply constraints and other frictions in 
the corporate bond market limit price discovery.  Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) find 
that, although the majority of corporate bond spreads are comprised of default risk, a 
significant component of these spreads is not related to corporate credit risk but is driven 
primarily by bond illiquidity and time series variation.  The introduction of daily credit 
default swap (CDS) spreads gives the researcher ability to directly measure event related 
changes in default risk.  CDS spreads conveniently provide a single, constant maturity 
security measurement of default risk rather than requiring time-consuming aggregation 
across potentially hundreds of heterogeneous individual debt issues for a given firm.  More 
importantly, as noted by Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Das, Kalimipalli, and 
Nayak (2014), credit default swaps have replaced cash bonds as the primary source of 
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price discovery in credit markets.  With a better credit measurement security and a 
timelier event window less impacted by unrelated factors, the effect of these corporate 
events on firm default risk can be measured more accurately.   
Using Bloomberg credit market data, I examine both bond returns and CDS spread 
changes around acquisitions, common equity repurchases, and seasoned equity offerings 
from 2002 through 2014 to reexamine the direct consequences of these events to creditors 
as well as potential interactions with shareholders.  If both markets are effectively 
capturing only default risk, corporate events that exhibit negative (positive) bond returns 
will also exhibit increases (decreases) in CDS spreads.   
I find that acquirer bond returns are negative and highly significant, while non-
parametric tests indicate that CDS changes are statistically weaker and economically less 
significant.  The mean spread increase in excess of CDS indices for acquirers is only 0.9 
basis points (bps), compared to pre-acquisition spread levels exceeding 150 bps.  Acquirer 
default risk increases, but this increase is only a small component of changes observed in 
the cash bond market.   
I also find bond returns around common equity repurchase announcements to be 
negative and highly significant.  While this result could support a repurchase-driven 
leveraging effect transferring wealth from bondholders to shareholders, CDS spread 
changes are indistinguishable from zero and do not support a repurchase related increase 
in default risk.  Stripped of liquidity effects, repurchases incur no change in default risk, 
indicating a counterbalance between signaling benefits and increased leverage.   
SEOs also exhibit differences between the two credit markets.  Examining 436 SEOs 
with bond returns and 153 with CDS spread changes from 2002 through 2014, I find that 
bond returns are not significantly different from zero, yet CDS spreads exhibit significant 
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mean declines of 16.6 basis points.  This result, along with multivariate tests showing that 
larger SEOs are associated with significant declines in CDS spreads, confirms the 
deleveraging effect of prior studies.  However, controlling for other factors, equity CARs 
are positively (negatively) correlated with bond returns (CDS spread changes), providing 
support for a signaling hypothesis as well.  Creditors primarily benefit from the 
deleveraging effect of SEOs, but this reduction in default risk is slightly moderated by the 
negative signals present in equity returns.  
I find strong evidence that a measure of bond market illiquidity, the age of a firm’s 
credit rating, significantly lowers bondholder returns around all three events.  Despite the 
bond market’s negative reactions to acquisitions and repurchases, little to no post-event 
decline in firm credit rating is observable.  Contrary to prior studies, negative covenants 
specific to these events do not explain variation in either cash bond returns or CDS 
spread changes.  These results suggest that time-varying credit market liquidity, not the 
presence of event related covenants, has greater impact on creditor wealth during these 
events.  I also examine the influence of indenture characteristics (calls, puts, 
collateralization, and seniority) on individual bond returns.  For instance, I find weak 
evidence that senior bonds perform better (worse) for acquirer (target) firms, secured 
bonds outperform during repurchases, and putable bonds become less valuable following 
SEOs. 
I also present analysis of corporate event-level changes in the CDS-bond basis (i.e., 
non-default spread change differences between bond and CDS markets).  I find that the 
CDS-bond basis changes around acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs are weakly 
statistically significant but economically large, particularly in relation to changes in cash 
bond spreads.  I introduce the basis credit ratio (BCR), the ratio between event window 
changes in the CDS-bond basis and overall bond spreads respectively, in order to better 
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understand the importance of liquidity and identify when cash bond reactions to events 
are less likely to reflect changes in firm default risk.  BCR is consistently negative and 
highly significant, indicating that very large portions of total bond spread changes are 
driven by factors unrelated to default risk.  Median BCRs in the primary sample show 
that liquidity changes make up 51.1%, 69.6%, and 50.9% of the cash bond spread change 
for acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs respectively.     
The drivers of even small CDS-basis changes are important on a scale this large: 
acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs with traded CDS contracts represent over $77 trillion 
in total debt value over a 13 year period.1  Changes in the CDS-bond basis are an 
economically large component ($39.9 billion in total liquidity driven wealth changes from 
2002 through 2014) relative to excess bond spread variation ($10.6 billion in wealth 
changes).  However, the basis point discrepancy between these credit markets, consistent 
with limits to arbitrage in credit markets documented in the literature by Bai and Collin-
Dufresne (2013), is not large relative to transactions costs.  Additionally, with the 
exception of the financial crisis period, CDS-based creditor wealth effects are generally 
much smaller than those experienced by shareholders, providing evidence that equity is 
influenced far more by changes in firm characteristics introduced by these corporate 
events.2 
As pointed out by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009), the requirement of 
traded CDS contracts does bias my samples towards larger firms and, as a result, I 
provide direct CDS-bond subsample comparison when applicable.  I also provide, to the 
                                                     
1 Total long and short term debt by event type for firms with traded CDS contracts (all firms), the primary sample in my study, is 
$34.74 trillion ($41.46 trillion) for acquisitions, $31.34 trillion ($53.83 trillion) for common equity repurchases, and $10.935 trillion 
($15.415 trillion) for seasoned equity offerings.  More information on a transaction level basis is available in Table 3. 
2 For example, while acquirer equity returns in my primary sample are not significantly different from zero, the bottom quartile of 
deals in the 2002-2014 sample period of my study destroyed $465 billion of acquirer equity value.  Similarly, shareholders of the top 
(bottom) return quartile of common equity repurchasing (SEO issuing) firms gained (lost) a total of $335 ($85) billion. 
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best of my knowledge, the first examination of the representativeness of CDS event 
studies from a firm industry perspective.  Surprisingly, financial firms are generally 
underrepresented while utilities are overrepresented, primarily in seasoned equity 
offerings.  In aggregate, by performing event studies on spreads of credit default swaps, 
the most appropriate financial instrument, these results provide new information 
regarding the default-risk-related impact of acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs on 
corporate security holders with potentially different interests. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses measurement 
of credit changes around corporate events, introduces the basis credit ratio, and 
summarizes the various drivers of bondholder returns around such events documented in 
prior literature.  Section 3 describes the corporate event and credit market data during 
the sample period.  Section 4 investigates individual and firm aggregate cash bond 
returns, changes in CDS spreads, changes in the CDS-bond basis, and the basis credit 
ratio around acquisitions, common equity repurchases, and seasoned equity offerings.  
Section 5 analyzes the default and liquidity related economic impact of these events to 
creditors and contrasts to shareholder effects. Section 6 presents robustness checks as well 
as industry considerations and selection biases for CDS event studies.  Finally, section 7 
provides a brief conclusion. 
2 Creditors and Corporate Events 
 2.1 Measuring Corporate Credit Changes 
Changes in firm default risk around corporate events have traditionally been 
measured using cash bond returns.  Market innovations have introduced new financial 
instruments that more directly measure changes in credit quality.  In particular, the use 
of credit default swap (CDS) contracts has grown substantially since the start of the 21st 
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century.  After reaching a peak notional outstanding value of $33.142 trillion in 2008, the 
single name (i.e. individual firm) CDS market has declined to a total of $10.845 trillion in 
2014, an amount still 191% larger than just ten years prior.3  This relatively new financial 
tool allows banks and other financial intermediaries to hedge credit risk on their books 
from debt instruments issued by both firms and government entities.  Empirical results 
from Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) indicate that, because cash bond spreads contain 
both interest rate risk and substantial liquidity components, CDS market spreads present 
the most direct available measure of default risk.  Unlike cash bonds, which can be very 
difficult to short sell and often incorporate significantly large illiquidity premiums, credit 
default swaps are in zero net supply.  These differences help to explain the findings of 
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) who find that the CDS market leads the cash bond 
market and CDSs contribute 80% of price discovery in bond prices.  The emergence of 
CDSs as the best source of credit quality measurement has been driven by changes in 
institutional behavior.  For example, Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that CDS prices 
incorporate inside information within financing banks before leveraged buyouts (LBOs) 
and Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak (2014) provide evidence that many credit investors have 
shifted away from corporate bond to CDS markets.  Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and 
Xu (2009) note that, because CDS contracts use a reference entity (firm, government, 
etc.) and not an individual debt security, CDS spreads conveniently aggregate debt 
instruments into a single variable, offering a more convenient tool for firm-level analysis. 
CDS spreads also offer advantages relative to traditional credit agency-produced 
ratings.  Corporate credit ratings are slow to respond to new information, may reflect 
substantial biases, and can be generally inconsistent over time.  In fact, Flannery, 
Houston, and Partnoy (2010) suggest that CDS spreads might eventually serve as a 
                                                     
3 See Statistical Release: OTC Derivative Statistics at end-June 2014, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Monetary and 
Economic Department (http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1411.pdf). 
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substitute for agency-produced credit ratings.  Flannery, Houston, and Partnoy (2010) 
conclude that “CDS spreads reflect information more quickly and accurately than credit 
ratings.” In Tang’s (2009) credit rating refinement context, a continuous, market-based 
measure of credit quality like CDSs will likely reduce informational asymmetries relative 
to a slowly updating, agency-generated, and discrete credit rating.  Time series variation 
in credit ratings may also be of concern.  For example, Alp (2013) finds that rating 
standards are not constant over time and can vary substantially between investment and 
speculative grade issues.  With biases and conflicts of interest in the debt ratings of 
structured fixed income products being notorious and still pervasive,4 recent work by 
Fracassi, Petry, and Tate (2015) using credit analyst fixed effects also finds substantial 
biases in the ratings and yields of new and existing corporate bond issues.  The authors 
link analyst biases to cash bond market prices and establish a connection to financing 
decisions made by firm managers.  These decisions are likely to be optimal if based on 
default risk measurements with less bias.  However, despite the reduction in bias due to 
the many market driven advantages associated with CDSs, few corporate finance studies 
have made extensive use of CDS spread data. 
Additional credit rating agency-based biases are prevalent in bond markets.   Kisgen 
and Strahan (2010) note that participants in cash bond markets face credit ratings-based 
regulations.  For instance, many institutional investors are prohibited from holding bond 
issues that are not rated investment grade by one of the three primary credit rating 
agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s).  However, to the best of my 
knowledge, no such restriction for participants in the credit derivative markets exists.  
Bond market participants, therefore, have incentives to anticipate changes in credit 
ratings.  This is especially the case for downgrades, given that Hull, Predescu, and White 
                                                     
4 See, for example, “Credit Ratings Still Broken, Experts Say, Offer a Fix”, McClatchy Washington Bureau. July 9th, 2014 
(http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/07/09/232835/credit-ratings-still-broken-experts.html). 
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(2004) find that negative credit rating revision events outnumber positive ones 4.5 to 1.  
The larger sample results of Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) suggest that 
downgrades are more costly to bondholders (as well as stockholders) than upgrades are 
rewarding.  In comparison, relatively small impact of ratings downgrades on CDS spreads 
are documented by Hull, Predescu, and White (2004).  If credit rating agencies have not 
recently revised or reiterated a firm’s rating prior to a corporate event (i.e., the credit 
rating is older or “stale”), this lack of current information may lead to lower bond prices 
(higher spreads) driven by an increased probability of a negative credit rating revision.  
Given these market structure liquidity components of cash bond spreads, index-adjusted 
bond returns may be capturing something in addition to, or instead of, meaningful 
changes in default risk related to corporate events.   
Window length selection and time series variation are also highly influential in credit 
event studies.  Specifically, many previous corporate events in the literature, including 
Billett, King, and Mauer (2004) (acquisitions), Maxwell and Stephens (2003) (equity 
repurchases), and Eberhart and Siddique (2002) (seasoned equity offerings), use only 
monthly data.  Monthly returns increase the probability that extraneous firm 
developments may be driving results.  Several prior studies, including Hand, Holthausen, 
and Leftwich (1992), attempt to address this issue by examining only smaller, “non-
contaminated” subsamples.  Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) formally show 
that using daily bond data increases the power to detect abnormal returns compared to 
monthly data.  Following this methodology, I use daily bond and CDS Bloomberg data 
from 2002 through 2014 to examine the announcement impact of acquisitions, common 
equity repurchases, and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) on the creditors of transacting 
firms. 
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Unlike shareholders, bondholders generally do not have the ability to vote on these 
corporate transactions.  The presence of protective covenants embedded within the 
outstanding debt of a firm, however, may influence creditor returns or prevent 
transactions from being proposed by management.  For example, Reisel (2014) finds 
evidence that negative covenants reduce the cost of debt issuance.  Using Bloomberg 
individual bond indenture data, I construct firm level, bond-price-weighted variables for 
merger restriction, payout policy restriction, and limited indebtedness covenants.5   If a 
corporate event changes the value of such bond characteristics as puts, calls, collateral, 
and seniority, differences among a firm’s bond returns can result.  For instance, investors 
might sell junior or unsecured and buy senior or secured bonds within a firm if a 
corporate event increases default risk.  
I also examine potential influence of bank debt (term loans and revolvers) usage on 
event-related changes in bond prices and CDS spreads respectively.  This is relevant given 
that Norden and Wagner (2008) find that CDS spreads incorporate substantial 
information regarding private lending from banks and other financial intermediaries.6  
While bank debt is not part of the deliverable for a triggered CDS contract, defaults on 
bank loans can trigger a credit event and can influence firm default risk expressed in both 
cash bond and CDS spreads.7 
Substantial time series variation is also seen in changes in both credit default swap 
spreads and cash bond prices.  Increasing correlation among CDS markets, noted by the 
contagion effect of Jorion and Zhang (2007), suggests that credit time trends may be 
                                                     
5 Bank debt covenant data from Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) are not available after 2005 nor do the authors include merger restriction 
covenants and are therefore not incorporated within my study.  
6 Financial intermediaries may be strategically involved in both private lending and CDS speculation.  For anecdotal evidence, see 
“Blackstone Unit Wins in No-Lose Codere Trade: Corporate Finance” via Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-
22/blackstone-unit-wins-in-no-lose-codere-trade-corporate-finance.html).  
7 For more information regarding the role of bank loans in CDS credit event triggers, see “The Debate over Restructuring” in ABC of 
CDS: The Credit Guide to Credit Default Swaps via GFI Group (http://www.gfigroup.com/portal/pdfs/ABCofCDS.pdf). 
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important in years subsequent to earlier corporate bond event studies.  The importance of 
this time series variation echoes the spread decomposition work of Longstaff, Mithal, and 
Neis (2005) in the cash bond market.  Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak (2014) note that CDS 
liquidity and price discovery were lower during the instrument’s nascent period; they 
examine subsample periods to control for this time series variation.  Longstaff (2010) 
specifically documents financial contagion during the financial crisis, thus I incorporate a 
2007-2009 financial crisis indicator variable when small sample sizes do not permit the use 
of year fixed effects. 
 2.2 CDS-Bond Basis and the Basis Credit Ratio 
Corporate cash bond spreads reflect more than simply credit risk of the underlying 
firm.  De Wit (2006) and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013), among others, refer to this 
difference between the CDS spread and cash bond implied credit spread as the “CDS-
bond basis.” CDS-Bond Basist = CDS Spreadt − Bond Spreadt                    (1) 
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) find that individual bond and aggregate credit market 
liquidity are both important components of the CDS-bond basis.  Time fixed effects and 
appropriate bond benchmarks can address the former, while a firm specific measure across 
all outstanding bond issues (i.e. price-weighted bid-ask spread) is needed for the latter.  
Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013) show that the basis is usually negative and that its 
variation is principally explained by bond market liquidity risk, with smaller contributions 
from bond collateral quality and time-varying credit market conditions (funding costs and 
counterparty risk).  Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011) show that firm-
specific variables, such as firm leverage and asset tangibility, and individual bond 
characteristics, including covenants, influence average quarterly CDS-bond bases.  Though 
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tax components of corporate spreads in cash bonds may not be present in CDS spreads, 
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) also find that the effects of taxes are generally 
miniscule in comparison to liquidity.   
Liquidity premiums in CDS markets, though economically small, are also shown to 
be statistically significant by Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen (2011).  Comparably, 
individual corporate bond liquidity risk is recently shown by Lin, Wang, and Wu (2011) 
to be an economically significant component of expected bond returns.   It follows that 
analyses of the liquidity driven differences between these two markets around corporate 
events should address measures of liquidity in both credit markets and potential 
interaction. 
<Insert Figure 1> 
Recognizing far greater illiquidity in the cash bond market and assuming CDS 
markets more accurately measure default risk, one can easily visualize events during 
which cash bond market participants may erroneously attribute changes in bond 
prices/spreads to increases or decreases in firm default risk.  Figure 1 exhibits simulations 
of these scenarios.  Image (a) shows little variation in the CDS-bond basis: bond z-spread 
and CDS spread move with near identical slope during the event window and express the 
same increase in default risk.  Image (b) illustrates a negative liquidity shock decreasing 
the CDS-bond basis, while a credit shock increases bond and CDS spreads.  The bond 
spread, however, has steeper slope during the event window and suggests a greater 
increase in default risk.  Image (c) shows a negative liquidity shock decreasing the basis 
and increasing the bond spread but leaving default risk expressed in CDS spreads 
unchanged.  
<Insert Table 1> 
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In order to better quantify default changes expressed in bonds following a 
corporate event, I introduce the basis credit ratio (BCR): 
Basis Credit Ratiot−i,t+j = ∆CDS-Bond Basist−i,t+j ∆Bond Spreadt−i,t+j                         (2) 
The BCR captures the magnitude of non-default (predominantly liquidity-based) CDS-
bond basis changes around the event relative to total bond spread changes.  If the BCR is 
not different from zero, changes in the CDS-bond basis are negligible and bonds will 
accurately reflect changes in default risk.  If the BCR is positive, we are more likely to 
observe the expected relationship between default risk and bond spreads (i.e. when bond 
spreads are increasing (decreasing), CDS spreads are also increasing (decreasing)).  In 
situations where the BCR is negative or undefined, the expected relationship can reverse: 
increases (decreases) in bond spreads can be associated with decreases (increases) in 
default risk.  If BCRs are between -1 and 0, the ratio describes the magnitude of liquidity 
(and other non-default) changes to total bond spread changes.  Table 1 presents a 
summary matrix using the BCR to describe how meaningful changes in default risk are in 
each scenario.  In short, the BCR provides a simple, firm aggregate measurement of how 
specific corporate events, such as acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs, influence firm 
creditors in manners unrelated to default risk. 
 2.3 Acquisitions 
Positive target bond and equity returns around acquisitions have been well-
documented throughout the literature by Mandelker (1974) and others.  Asquith, Bruner, 
and Mullins (1983) find positive returns to acquiring shareholders, while more recent 
evidence from Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) indicates economically large 
acquiring firm equity losses.  Acquirer bond returns, however, have received less attention 
 
 14 
in the literature.  Assuming that acquirer equity returns are generally non-positive, 
observable benefits to creditors (positive returns to bondholders or declines in CDS 
spreads) may support an intra-firm wealth transfer hypothesis.  If creditors experience 
wealth declines along with shareholders, an acquirer wealth destruction hypothesis across 
both debt and equity (or, alternatively described, an inter-firm wealth transfer from 
acquirer to target security holders) is applicable.  Empirical studies of debt instruments 
around acquisitions can provide more insight. 
One important work from Billett, King, and Mauer (2004), documents significant 
positive wealth effects to target bondholders, and significantly negative, though arguably 
economically insignificant, excess returns for acquirer bondholders from 1979 through 
1997.  Furfine and Rosen (2011) use Expected Default Frequency (EDF), a statistic 
developed by Moody’s KMV, and find that mergers increase corporate default risk.  These 
credit rating agency-produced data, however, introduce potential conflict of interest.  
Billett, King, and Mauer (2004) suggest that the magnitude of bond returns declines in 
the 1990s and attribute this result to the widespread introduction of event restriction 
covenants (ERC).   
Other firm and deal characteristics documented in the literature may also strongly 
influence corporate credit quality.  For example, Chang (1998) finds higher acquirer 
equity returns for deals involving private targets.  Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) 
find that acquisitions involving private firms represent over 80% of total takeover activity.  
The authors suggest that acquiring shareholders capture private target illiquidity 
discounts and other benefits.  With respect to payment form, Travlos (1987) finds weak 
evidence of differences between stock and cash payment in acquiring bondholder returns, 
but the results of Billett, King, and Mauer (2004) indicate no difference in bondholder 
reaction with respect to form of payment.  Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012) 
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show that exogenous declines (increases) in cash levels (i.e., those that are not a response 
to changes in credit), result in higher (lower) bond spreads.  In an acquisition context, 
acquiring firms with improving credit gain better access to future financing via capital 
markets and may therefore choose to pay with more cash on hand. 
Additional deal characteristics may also impact acquiring firm credit.  For instance, 
acquirers may realize lower cost of credit in Amihud and Lev (1981) resulting from asset 
diversification in deals between firms of different industries.  Penas and Unal (2004) 
examine any bondholder wealth effects specific to the financial industry, including 
acquisitions resulting in “too-big-to-fail” status.  Almeida and Campello (2007) note that 
pledgeable assets, or tangibility, support more borrowing and thus credit spreads may 
widen to anticipate increased post-merger leverage levels.  Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 
(2005) find that strong antitakeover provisions lower a firm’s cost of debt while Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie (2007) find that stronger governance (i.e., weaker antitakeover provisions) 
benefits acquiring shareholders in M&A transactions.  Furfine and Rosen (2011) observe 
that higher idiosyncratic acquirer volatility and greater options compensation for 
acquiring CEOs both contribute to greater deal related incremental default risk.  Hoberg 
and Phillips (2010) find that acquirers in more competitive product markets experience 
greater equity returns around deal announcement, especially when purchasing targets in 
less competitive markets.  Given these findings, an analysis of acquisition-related changes 
in credit quality should also include controls for asset tangibility, corporate governance, 
equity volatility, executive compensation, CEO optimism/overconfidence, and product 
market fluidity.  Both Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009) and Uysal (2011) examine the 
role of excess leverage and acquisitions.  That is, it is important to control for the 
possibility that shareholders of post-acquisition firms moving to more (less) optimal 
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leverage ratios will benefit more (less).  From the credit perspective, deals resulting in 
“too much” combined firm leverage may lead to increased default risk. 
 2.4 Common Equity Repurchases 
Unlike acquisitions, event studies of common equity repurchases generally involve 
only characteristics of the single transacting firm.  More importantly, while an acquisition 
may have either leverage-increasing or -decreasing effects, depending on a variety of deal 
characteristics, completed repurchases mechanically increase firm leverage.  Repurchases 
are, in essence, partial leveraged buyouts of firms’ shareholders, with the degree of 
leverage used determined both by the repurchase size and the source of financing (cash or 
debt).  Ceteris paribus, the leveraging effect of equity repurchases will increase default 
risk of the firm, resulting in higher CDS spreads.  Maxwell and Stephens (2003) describe 
this effect as wealth redistribution from bondholders to shareholders that is influenced by 
greater repurchase size and lower firm credit quality.  To protect creditors from this type 
of wealth redistribution, some corporate bonds include covenants restricting form and size 
of payouts to shareholders. 
Maxwell and Stephens (2003) also find support in cash bond returns for the signaling 
hypothesis of common equity repurchases.  Early studies by Vermaelen (1981) and Dann 
(1981) find that positive equity returns around repurchase event windows are driven by 
positive information signaling by firms.  Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) 
present evidence that the equity market’s response to this signal is influenced by firm 
valuation, emphasizing the need to control for market-to-book ratio and lagged firm 
equity returns.  Dann (1981) also analyzes bondholder returns but finds little evidence of 
signaling gains, or losses, to bondholders.  With pure wealth redistribution, changes in 
total firm asset value will be zero around repurchases.  However, since both Dann (1981) 
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and Maxwell and Stephens (2003) find increases in total firm value, these results do not 
rule out a signaling effect. 
Additional factors that drive equity returns around repurchases may also influence 
creditors.  For instance, Chen and Wang (2012) find that, despite financial constraints, 
managerial hubris induces repurchases that do not increase shareholder wealth.  Similarly, 
firms with high levels of managerial (Fenn and Liang (2001)) and non-managerial (Kahle 
(2002)) stock options compensation engage in repurchases with less positive equity market 
reactions that can potentially increase default risk.  Agency issues also follow from Berger, 
Ofek, and Yermack (1997), who find that more entrenched managers prefer lower leverage 
ratios and this may therefore influence repurchase decisions.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) 
find that repurchases and dividends function as substitutes, suggesting that the presence 
of a recurring dividend yield can also influence market reaction to repurchases.  Product 
market competition can also influence repurchase returns.  Specifically, Massa, Rehman, 
and Vermaelen (2007) provide evidence of repurchase mimicking among rivals in highly 
competitive industries.  Finally, liquidity issues around open market repurchases are also 
important to consider.  Barclay and Smith (1988) show that information-asymmetries-
related components of equity bid-ask spreads widen around repurchases.  To address any 
liquidity-driven explanation of credit quality changes around corporate transactions, any 
analysis of differences reflected in bonds and CDSs should consider liquidity levels and 
interactions between the two markets, emphasizing the informative role of BCRs. 
 2.5 Seasoned Equity Offerings 
Contrary to common equity repurchases, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) 
mechanically increase equity and deleverage the capital structure of the firm.   The 
impact of this change around SEOs is examined by Eberhart and Siddique (2002) in both 
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equity and bond markets.  The authors find that the deleveraging effect of SEOs reduces 
default risk and results in a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders.  Similarly, 
Elliott, Prevost, and Rao (2009) examine a sample of 99 SEOs with bond returns from 
1990 through 2002 and find significantly positive returns that also support a “leverage risk 
reduction hypothesis.”  This deleveraging effect can also be described in the context of the 
near-term cash motivation of SEOs introduced by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010).  
An infusion of much-needed cash from the equity issuance should, all else equal, decrease 
the probability of and/or delay the firm’s default, with an expected result of higher bond 
prices and lower CDS spreads. 
<Insert Table 2> 
SEOs also exhibit a strong informational signal.  The seminal work of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) behind pecking order theory supports the signaling hypothesis of seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs).  The “rational investor reaction to [SEOs] is ‘bad news’”; 
consistent with this Masulis and Korwar (1986) and subsequent studies document strongly 
negative announcement equity returns to SEO issuing firms.  If this signaling hypothesis 
dominates the effects of deleveraging, creditors of the SEO issuing firm should experience 
negative wealth effects similar to shareholders.  Bond covenants may also play a role in 
SEOs: if a firm is unable to issue new debt primarily because of the presence of limited 
debt negative covenants, this may influence the choice to issue equity and the strength of 
the signal received by credit and equity markets.  Similar to common equity repurchases, 
extensive literature necessitates the incorporation of a wide variety of factors influencing 
SEOs, including market-to-book ratio, lagged firm stock return, product market 
competition, operating cash flow, asset tangibility, and manager-agent related variables. 
To summarize, I present hypotheses and related literature for both equity and credit 
wealth effects around acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs in Table 2. 
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3 Data 
 3.1 Corporate Event and Control Data 
I obtain all merger and acquisition, common equity repurchase, and seasoned equity 
offering transaction level data from SDC Platinum.  Applicable accounting and Standard 
and Poor’s credit ratings data are from Compustat and I retrieve stock price and 
volatility data from CRSP and OptionMetrics respectively.  Since the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) did not standardize credit default swap contracts 
until 1999 and the earliest Bloomberg/Markit CDS data are available for 2001, I only 
consider transactions, both completed and withdrawn, from 2002 through 2014.   I begin 
filtering the initial SDC samples by eliminating all internal assets sales (acquisitions with 
the same target and acquirer CUSIPs) and all transactions involving firms outside of the 
United States.  To limit the study to corporate events of sufficiently large economic 
impact, I remove all acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs under $1 million dollars and 
those transactions with values less than 0.5% of a firm’s market capitalization.  For 
acquisitions, these filters reduce the raw SDC sample to an initial All Deals sample of 
approximately 13,850 deals from 2002 to 2014. 
<Insert Table 3> 
Summary statistics for acquirers and public targets in the All Deals sample are 
reported in column group (3) and (4) respectively of Panel A in Table 3.  Similar sample 
descriptive statistics are available in Panel B and C for 8,066 repurchases and 6,551 SEOs 
respectively.  I also provide sample statistics for primary samples in column (2) and CDS-
bond subsamples in column (1).  The primary samples include all initial sample 
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transactions for which a firm has a CDS ticker listed on Bloomberg.8  This CDS ticker 
requirement results in 1,481 total merger and acquisition transactions, 1,342 repurchases 
in Panel B, and 525 SEOs in Panel C.  The requirement of both CDS and bond event 
data further reduces the size of the CDS-bond subsamples. 
I adjust Total Assets and Market Cap by the CPI index and report both in millions 
of 2014 dollars.  Not surprisingly, both variables increase when moving from larger to 
smaller samples with available credit market data.  To incorporate the impact of available 
debt capacity and leverage targets, I calculate excess leverage as the difference between 
observed and predicted leverage according to Uysal (2011).9  S&P Rating is a numerical 
translation of the Standard and Poor’s firm level credit rating according to Odders-White 
and Ready (2006).10  The highest rating, AAA+, receives a score of 36 while the lowest 
rating, D, takes a score of 12.  The Investment Grade Rating indicator variable takes a 
value of 1 if S&P Rating is greater than or equal to 25 (BBB-) and 0 if it is 24 (BB-) or 
below.  S&P Rating Age is the number of days elapsed from the date of the firm S&P 
rating issue or reiteration to the event announcement date.  A full list of variable 
definitions for event specific controls discussed in section 2 is provided in the appendix. 
Comparing characteristics across samples, for acquisitions in Panel A, excess leverage 
is approximately twice as high in the CDS-bond subsample compared to the primary and 
full sample.  Since the CDS-bond subsample also exhibits increased asset and market 
equity values, many of the differences (lower implied volatility, higher operating cash flow 
                                                     
8 CDS ticker availability for the primary sample is equivalent to the CDS Traded variable definition in Saretto and Tookes (2013).  If 
CDS spread quotes are available during the event, the firm is considered to have CDS Trading.  If bond prices are also available, the 
event is a member of the CDS-bond subsample. 
9 Regression results for target leverage, calculated with Newey and West (1987) standard errors, are available in Table 15 of the 
appendix. 
10 I use the numerical rating convention of Odders-White and Ready (2006), rather than that of BKM, because translating NR (1) 
below D (2) can be misleading.  In the Odders-White and Ready (2006) numbering, NR (no rating) ratings are treated as missing.  
This is consistent with the idea that a firm with no rating is not necessarily of worse credit quality than one in default (D). 
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yield, etc.) between the bigger samples and this CDS-bond subsample are driven by larger 
firm size.  In contrast to the 1979 through 1997 sample of Billett, King, and Mauer (2004) 
or BKM, the acquirers in the primary sample are larger by total assets (7.72%) and 
market capitalization (28.37%).11  These larger primary sample acquiring firm sizes are 
likely due to the more restrictive deal filters used in this study, as well as the CDS 
availability bias noted by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009).  These sample 
representation differences also explain lower target leverage (0.258 versus 0.44 in BKM).   
Differences in acquirer leverage (0.267 versus 0.41) may be due to changes in aggregate 
mean firm leverage over the sample periods.  Though acquirer unadjusted implied 
volatility (unreported) is 2% higher for acquiring firms in the primary sample than for 
those in BKM, much of this difference (1.2%) is explained by higher systematic volatility 
in the 2002 through 2014 period.12  Mean E-Index for acquiring firms in the primary 
sample is 2.492, a number nearly identical to the 2002 firm average of 2.49 found in 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). 
Credit ratings between the study samples, adjusted for the numbering method, are 
similar both in level and difference between acquirers and targets.  Median target ratings 
are three notches below acquirer ratings compared to two for BKM. Alleviating some of 
the CDS availability concerns of Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009), primary 
sample investment grade ratings are similar for acquirers in column (2) (0.810 versus 
0.82), though somewhat lower for targets in column (4) (0.341 versus 0.63).  Additional 
summary statistics for public targets are presented in column (4) of Panel A.  Targets are 
smaller in total assets ($3.76 versus $24.9 billion in BKM) and market value ($1.85 versus 
$5.7 billion).  Targets exhibit median excess leverage of -3%.  Differences in target size 
                                                     
11 BKM sample acquirer mean market capitalization is $16.6 billion in 2014 dollars with mean assets of $43.1 billion. 
12 CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index (VOX) data only goes back to 1986 while BKM study the 1979 through 1997 period.  The VOX 
averages 19.2% from 1986 through 1997 and 20.4% from 2002 through 2014. 
See http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx for more information. 
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and excess leverage are likely driven by increasingly frequent and relatively larger 
acquisitions of private firms (73% of targets in the primary sample) and the inclusion of 
public targets without long term debt.  On aggregate, with the inseparable exception of 
firm size and CDS availability, descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 3 are similar to 
those found in prior literature. 
Turning to common equity repurchases, the larger size of firms with traded CDS 
contracts is again apparent.  Repurchasing firms with bond returns in Maxwell and 
Stephens (2003) have mean market capitalization (total assets) of $8.35 ($21.92) billion in 
2014 dollars.  These firms are substantially smaller than those in my primary sample but 
are comparable to members of the All Repurchases sample.  Interestingly, these size 
differences are not driven by the inclusion of financials (and utilities): mean market 
capitalization for industrial firms in the primary (CDS-bond) sample is $30.75 ($41.92) 
billion, similar to the firm equity sizes presented in Panel B of Table 3.  While lower for 
the All Repurchases sample (2.677 versus 2.99 in Maxwell and Stephens (2003)), 
repurchasing firms in the primary sample have 20% higher market/book equity ratios.   
Both mean and median repurchase sizes relative to market capitalization are larger from 
2002 through 2014 when compared to 1980 through 1997, as well as to the 1990-2007 
Chen and Wang (2012) time period.  Similar to the 1990-2007 period, open market 
repurchases (OMRs) represent over 90% of share repurchases.  In fact, this proportion has 
increased to above 94% in all three of my repurchase samples, further indicating that 
OMRs continue to dominate as the preferred repurchase method. 
With respect to seasoned equity offerings in Panel C, the primary sample of my 
study has mean credit rating very close (25.12) to the 1980-1992 sample mean BBB- (25) 
of Ebberhart and Siddique (2002).  Market/book equity ratios are substantially higher in 
my primary sample (2.239 vs 1.30) but are comparable to the 2.1 ratio of the 1990-2002 
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sample of Elliott, Prevost, and Rao (2009).  In comparison to this more recent study of 99 
SEOs, my primary sample has a mean market capitalization that is 42% larger ($9.21 
versus $6.57 billion in 2014 dollars), of slightly lower duration (5.54 versus 5.7), and with 
a higher proportion of investment grade issuers (0.70 versus 0.61).  Comparing leverage is 
more difficult in the SEO case because the authors of the 1990-2002 study do not provide 
total debt, only total liabilities relative to assets.  SEO size relative to firm market 
capitalization in my primary and CDS-bond subsamples is similar to the 1990-2002 time 
period, but the All SEOs sample has mean and median SEO size that are nearly twice as 
large.  While these comparisons do raise potential sample selection issues, particularly 
with respect to transacting firm size, the examination of different methods of measuring 
credit effects of acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs is most economically meaningful for 
these largest events.  Further discussion of sample representativeness, including industrial 
composition, is presented in section 6. 
 3.2 Credit Market Data 
I obtain both cash bond and CDS data for the primary sample from Bloomberg. I 
employ Bloomberg data for several important reasons.  The role of Bloomberg in credit 
market function is substantial: on April 17th, 2015, a two hour global outage across 
Bloomberg terminals forced the United Kingdom to delay a £3 billion debt offering.13 
Bloomberg users are able to access both cash bond and credit derivative pricing data in a 
single, convenient source.  Data are easily accessible through the Open Bloomberg API via 
Bloomberg terminals available for use in most business schools.14  Unlike dealer specific 
CDS data used in many prior studies, Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak (2014) note that 
                                                     
13 See Bloomberg’s Global Outage Paralyses Investors via Financial Times at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2fc47e84-e4e3-11e4-
bb4b-00144feab7de.html.  
14 I use RBloomberg, an R front end for Open Bloomberg Java API, to facilitate data collection. See http://findata.org/rbloomberg/.  
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Bloomberg has “an extensive coverage of CDS data and is widely recognized as a 
benchmark pricing source.”15 
Cash bond excess returns in the literature are calculated in excess of a credit quality 
appropriate bond benchmark index.  For example, Billett, King, and Mauer (2004) use 18 
different bond indices based on intermediate- or long-term maturity classification and nine 
Standard and Poor’s bond ratings categories.  To be consistent with the bifurcated credit 
quality of the hybrid CDS indices, I adjust investment grade (high yield) cash bond 
returns by the return of the Barclays Investment Grade (High Yield) Corporate Bond 
indices.  These investment grade and high yield indices are further broken down into short 
(0-3 years), intermediate (3-10 years), and long (10+ years) maturity based indices.16 
Therefore, I calculate returns of individual firm bonds in excess of one of these six indices.  
Like the firm-level bond characteristic measures, firm-level bond excess returns are a 
weighted average based on the market value of each bond.  I calculate aggregate firm p’s 
bond returns for its n bonds as follows: rBondp,(t−i,t+j) = ∑ BondValuep,q∑ BondValuep,rnr=1 �BondPricep,t+j−BondPricep,t−iBondPriceI,t−i − BondIndexg,m,t+j−BondIndexg,m,t−iBondIndexg,m,t−i �nq=1       (3) 
Where each firm bond j with credit rating g has a maturity matched benchmark BondIndexg,m. 
For my analysis, I extend the standard [-1,+1] window generally used in the 
traditional event study literature to a longer [-5,+1] window due to permanent conditional 
information flow in credit instruments documented by Acharya and Johnson (2007).17 As 
in BKM and most other bond event studies, all convertible bonds are removed to 
                                                     
15 For a brief comparison of Bloomberg and Markit CDS spread data, see section 6. 
16 Excess bond returns are only available until April 1st, 2014 because Barclays was not willing to freely provide investment grade and 
high yield maturity matched index data after April 15th, 2014 for my analysis.  For robustness, I provide credit rating level security 
returns and spread changes in Table 4A and Table 9A of the appendix respectively. 
17 Alternative event window specifications are presented in Table 14 of the appendix and discussed in section 6. 
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eliminate any contamination in prices from equity option components.  Number of Bond 
Issues is the quantity of different bond issues in Bloomberg, regardless of price 
availability, matching the 6-digit CUSIP prefix of the transacting firm. Bond Duration is 
the change in price divided by the change in yield over the event window, both generated 
by Bloomberg.  Like all of the cash bond variables, with the exception of Number of 
Bonds, Bond Duration is a weighted average for each acquiring firm observation based on 
the market value of each bond.  Cov Ratio: Limited Debt, Merger Restriction, and Payout 
Policy are also weighted averages using Bloomberg’s bond issue covenant indicator 
variables.  While the higher mean and median values for Cov Ratio: Merger Restrictive 
support BKM’s finding of widespread use of event restriction covenants (ERCs), a 
standard deviation of 0.29 in column (2) of Panel A in Table 3 suggests that there is 
indeed reasonable variation within this variable.  Cov Ratio: Limited Debt and Cov Ratio: 
Payout Policy are less prevalent but exhibit similar levels of variation throughout all the 
transacting firm panels (B and C).  A full list of bond characteristics captured from 
Bloomberg is available in the variable definitions section of the appendix. 
I use several different variables to capture bond market liquidity.  Bond Relative 
Bid-Ask Spread is a traditional liquidity measure calculated as the pre-event difference 
between ask and bid prices of a bond divided by the bid-ask midpoint.  Bond Trade 
Volume is the number of trades across a firm’s bonds reported to Bloomberg.  I also 
calculate Bond Age to reflect off/on-the-run liquidity and S&P Rating Age to capture 
illiquidity related to the cash bond market’s dependence on credit ratings.  Because 
Houweling, Mentink, and Ton Vorst (2005) show limited differences between bond market 
liquidity proxies, I use only Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread and S&P Rating Age primarily 
through my analyses. 
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Unlike heterogeneous bonds, credit default swaps are available on a set of standard 
maturities.  Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) indicate that 85% of CDS quotes occur in 
the 5-year maturity.  Since this liquidity concentration around maturity has persisted, I 
use 5-year CDS data exclusively throughout my study.18  Prior to the event window, CDS 
spreads are quoted in basis points (CDS Spread) and I also obtain bid and ask CDS 
liquidity data from Bloomberg that are standardized into CDS Bid-Ask Spread.  CDS 
pricing data are available for only 28.7% (425 observations) of acquiring firms in the 
primary sample.  Cash bond data, however, are available for 879 acquirer observations 
(59.3%).  For 1,340 public targets with some debt, CDS and cash bond data are available 
for 4.18% and 8.88% respectively.   For common equity repurchases, CDS data and cash 
bond return data are available for 44.1% (592 observations) and 71.4% (958) of the 
primary repurchase sample.  SEOs include bond data for 48.4% (254 observations) of the 
primary SEO sample, while CDS data represent 20.0% (105).  As a reference point, 
Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) present evidence suggesting that samples 
approaching 500 (120) observations have sufficient power to detect abnormal price shocks 
of ± 15 (50) basis points.19 
Stock returns around these corporate events are calculated using Fama and French 
(1996) four factor value-weighted market index adjusted return, which is the standard 
convention in the merger and acquisition literature.  However, CDS spread change 
adjustment procedures differ.  My study follows the credit index adjustment methodology 
noted in Norden and Weber (2004).  The best known United States centric CDS spread 
                                                     
18 I use only CDS contracts referencing all senior debt obligations of the firm.  Few firms, primarily financials, have active senior and 
subordinated CDS markets.  Note that Table 3 indicates that over 90% of bond value for each transacting firm is unsubordinated.  For 
more information about credit derivatives definitions, see 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions via International Swaps and 
Dealers Association (http://www2.isda.org/asset-classes/credit-derivatives/2014-isda-credit-derivatives-definitions/). CDS spreads are 
composite closing daily quote midpoints from the New York and London Bloomberg desks and several other dealer networks reporting 
to Bloomberg. 
19 Assuming duration of 5 and negligible non-linearity in the relationship between credit prices and spreads, this would be comparable 
to a change in credit spread of ±3 (10) basis points. 
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index, the Markit North American Investment Grade index, did not debut until October 
2005.  Its high yield counterpart, the Markit CDX North America High Yield index, was 
officially introduced the following month, but Bloomberg data availability for the index is 
not consistent until October 2009.20  To adjust investment grade CDS changes prior to 
October 2005, I use the percentage change in the Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAML) 
US Corporate Master Option-Adjusted Spread index.  Similarly, prior to October 2009, 
high yield CDS changes are benchmarked by the percentage change in the BAML US 
High Yield Master II Option-Adjusted Spread index.21  This produces both a hybrid 
investment grade and a hybrid high yield benchmark index used to adjust changes in 
single name CDS spreads relative to changes in the economy-wide corporate credit risk 
level.  If a firm’s credit rating is investment grade, its CDS spread change is adjusted by 
the change in the hybrid investment grade index.  Otherwise, the excess CDS change is 
calculated relative to the hybrid investment grade index.22  The CDS change is calculated 
as follows: 
∆CDSt−i,t+j = �CDS Spreadi,t+j − CDS Spreadi,t−i� − �CDS Indexg,t+j − CDS Indexg,t−i�;     (4) 
where each firm’s credit default swap CDS Spreadi has a credit rating-matched CDS Indexg.  It is important to note that positive CDS spread changes (increased default 
risk) are analogous to negative cash bond excess returns and vice versa. 
Because CDS spread changes and bond prices are not analogous, bond credit spreads 
must be calculated.  To adjust for the term structure of interest rates, I retrieve the zero 
                                                     
20 Bloomberg has some pricing data available for the Markit CDX North America High Yield index for 2007, but there are significant 
gaps in the data until October 2009. 
21 Both BofA Merrill Lynch Spread indices are obtained from the economic research database at the website of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/32297. 
22 Daily returns for these hybrid indices are significantly positively correlated (0.47, 0.01% level).  An alternative index choice based on 
above/below median CDS spreads, rather than agency determined investment grade credit rating, is likely to produce similar results.  
Both parametric and non-parametric unreported tests show no significant difference in CDS excess returns between observations using 
the BAML versus CDX index. 
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volatility spread (z-spread) directly from Bloomberg data.  Excess z-spread changes are 
constructed similarly to CDS spread changes but use only the BAML spread indices.23  I 
also obtain the CDS-bond basis from Bloomberg, calculated as in formula (1) but 
incorporating an interpolated credit default spread (across the firm’s CDS term structure) 
to match the maturity of an individual bond.24  Detailed formulas for z-spread and CDS-
bond basis calculation are available in variable definitions of the appendix.  Similar to 
bond returns, I calculate individual z-spread and CDS-bond levels and changes as price-
weighted firm aggregates.  Consistent with Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013), the basis is 
negative throughout each sample in Table 3, reflecting relative illiquidity in the cash bond 
market.  The relative magnitude of liquidity driven to total spread changes can 
subsequently be measured with the basis credit ratio. 
4 Empirical Results 
 4.1 Cash Bond Returns 
I present firm aggregated bond returns and common stock excess returns over the [-
5,+1] event window in Table 4.  Panels A, B, and C display univariate statistics for 
acquisitions (both acquirers and targets), common equity repurchases, and seasoned 
equity offerings respectively.  I display mean and median returns in percent and mark 
significant non-parametric cross-sectional differences after sample sizes.  Due to 
asymmetric distributions of changes in both bond prices and CDS spreads, non-parametric 
                                                     
23 Ideally, z-spread should be adjusted by maturity and investment grade/high yield spread indices similar to the bond price 
adjustment method.  Again, Barclays was not willing to freely provide investment grade and high yield maturity matched spread index 
and no comparable replacement exists to the best of my knowledge. 
24 Z-spread and CDS-bond basis data are available in Bloomberg beginning from 2006.  Elizalde, Doctor, and Saltuk (2009) and Bai 
and Collin-Dufresne (2013) recommend using the par-equivalent CDS spread (PECS) to calculate the CDS-bond basis because PECS 
calculation reflects the full CDS term structure.  I do not use PECS for several reasons: 1) Bloomberg uses z-spread exclusively to 
derive the basis, 2) the full term structure of CDS spreads is not often available, especially in an event study window, 3) PECS 
calculations, by Elizalde, Doctor, and Saltuk (2009) own admission, are not straightforward, and 4) recovery rates are related to 
individual bond and firm characteristics for which controls are readily available.  I also include controls for bond premium/discount 
that Elizalde, Doctor, and Saltuk (2009) note can influence basis trades.   
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univariate tests are emphasized throughout my study, as recommended by both Acharya 
and Johnson (2007) and Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009). 
Median acquirer firm aggregate cash bond excess returns in column (1) of Panel A 
are exclusively negative and highly significant across each sample.  CDS-bond subsample 
returns are significantly less (5% level) than those in the remainder of the full sample.  
Acquirer bondholder losses are moderated during the 2002-2006 period and exacerbated 
after 2010.  Additionally, there are strong differences (0.01% level) in medians returns in 
firms with older S&P credit ratings.  Differences between private/public target status and 
investment grade credit rating are insignificant.   
<Insert Table 4> 
I present target bond excess returns in column (2).  Consistent with BKM, target 
bond returns are significantly positive across all three samples, increasing by 0.94% in the 
primary sample.  Investment grade targets, targets with more recently updated credit 
ratings, and targets with below median bond relative bid-ask spreads (greater liquidity) 
perform better.  Smaller sample sizes limit the power of some cross-sectional tests.  
Interestingly, the only negative cross-section, albeit insignificant, is for the six private 
firms with publicly traded bonds shown in the last two rows of Panel A. 
Acquirer stock returns in column (3) of Table 4 are not different from zero in the 
primary or CDS-bond samples, but, consistent with Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), 
are significantly greater than zero in the full sample.  Moving to the primary and CDS-
bond samples, firm size increases greatly as median acquirer returns decrease to -0.092% 
and -0.370% respectively.  These results are wholly consistent with prior period and size 
effect evidence from Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004, 2005).  Additionally, 
acquirer equity returns are lowest (0.183%) during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and 
 
 30 
significantly lower, at the 0.01% level in non-parametric univariate tests, for acquisitions 
involving public, financial or utility, and investment grade targets.  Target stock returns, 
consistent with prior literature, are exclusively positive and highly significant across every 
cross-section.  Target returns exhibit cross-sectional differences over the three time 
periods, industry, and form of payment. 
 Univariate security excess return statistics for common equity repurchases are 
presented in Panel B of Table 4.  Repurchasing firm bonds experience highly significant 
(0.01% level) excess returns of -0.403% to -0.357% and provide preliminary support for 
the leveraging hypothesis.  Medians in the cross-section are significant at the 1% level or 
better in all but the specification with more recently revised S&P credit ratings, which are 
positive but insignificant.  The presence of more liquid bonds and older credit ratings is 
associated with greater bondholder losses and emphasizes the role of credit market 
liquidity around repurchases. 
Not surprisingly, mean (median) equity returns on [-5,+1] for repurchasing firms in 
column (2) of Panel B are significantly positive at 0.896% (0.882%) in the primary 
sample.  This result is slightly lower than mean (median) repurchasing firm equity returns 
of 1.49% (1.10%) in Maxwell and Stephens (2003), however, the All Repurchases [-1,+1] 
mean (median) CAR of 1.5% (1%) in column (3) of Panel B in Table 3 is very similar.  
Equity returns in the primary sample are largest during the financial crisis and smallest in 
the 2002-2006 period just before.  Non-parametric tests suggest that financial firms and 
utilities experience slightly lower stock returns when repurchasing shares than do 
industrial firms. 
For seasoned equity offerings in Panel C of Table 4, firm aggregate bond returns in 
column (1) are generally indistinguishable from zero and fail to distinguish between 
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deleveraging and signaling effects. Only bonds in the full sample experience positive 
returns of 0.09%, albeit weakly significant at the 10% level.  Similar to acquirers and 
repurchasing firms, bondholders of SEO issuing firms with more recently revised credit 
ratings experience significantly higher returns (1% level).  Sample size is a particular 
concern given the lower number of SEO observations with bond return data (456) relative 
to acquisitions (1,225) and repurchases (1,131). 
As expected, mean (median) stock return for firms issuing seasoned equity offerings 
is strongly negative at -1.837% (-1.838%) in the primary sample.  Returns are 72 basis 
points higher than in the full sample, a difference that is significant at the 1% level. Every 
cross-sectional median equity return in Panel C of Table 4 is negative at the 1% level or 
better.  SEO equity returns are lowest during the financial crisis and highest in the 2002-
2006 prior period.  Cross-sectional differences show that equity losses are exacerbated for 
both non-investment grade and industrial firms. 
Disregarding liquidity effects, univariate cash bond results in Table 4 suggest that 
acquisitions increase acquirer default risk while target securities experience gains, 
consistent with inter-firm wealth transfer.  Despite shareholder gains, repurchasing firm 
bondholders suffer losses, supporting the leveraging hypothesis.  For SEOs, shareholder 
returns reflect negative signaling, while bondholder returns are mainly unchanged.   
 4.1.1 Acquisitions 
Table 5 reports multivariate analyses of firm aggregate acquirer and target bond 
returns.  Panel A includes results for acquisitions with public targets.  The base 
specification in column (1) replicates much of the multivariate analysis of Billett, King, 
and Mauer (2004).  Despite suffering from small sample size, Cash Percentage of Payment 
is significant at the 5% level.  Specification (2) increases the sample size by changing 
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leverage and maturity variables; however the significance of cash is not persistent.  
Specifications (3) through (5) include event restriction covenant (ERC) variables.  The 
coefficient on Cov Ratio: Merger Restrictive is insignificant and opposite the anticipated 
sign, casting doubt on the covenant-based explanation of time series variation in BKM.  
Specifications (3) and (4) incorporate bond market liquidity variables, but only Log(S&P 
Credit Rating Age) enters with the expected sign and significance (1% level).  Target 
Equity CAR is included in specification (5) but enters insignificantly.  An unreported 
specification shows similar results if target bondholder returns are used.  With no 
relationship between acquirer bond returns and target securities after controlling for other 
factors, the wealth transfer hypothesis of acquirer creditors finds no support using cash 
bond market data.    
<Insert Table 5> 
Public target firm aggregate bond returns are analyzed in specifications (6) through 
(9) of Panel A.  Confirming the coinsurance findings of BKM, target bonds benefit when 
the credit rating of the acquirer is higher.  Unlike BKM, tender offer and hostile takeover 
variables are omitted as they are very rare events in the 2002-2014 sample period.  The 
power of these specifications, however, is limited by small sample size given that 72.7% of 
primary sample acquisition targets are private.  
Panel B of Table 5 shows analysis extended to both public and private targets.  
Specifications (1) through (4) are similar, with the exception of year fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and additional controls in the literature impacting acquirer equity returns.  
Validating the univariate statistics, only Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) enters significantly 
and remains consistent throughout each specification.  Firm size (Log(Market Cap)), ex-
ante acquirer risk (Implied Volatility), and industrial diversification (Same Industry 
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Dummy) enter with expected sign but are not generally statistically significant.  
Specification (5) introduces an interaction term for payment type and private target, 
while Cov Ratio: Merger Restrictive is again introduced in specification (6).  Similar to 
public targets, ERCs show little benefit to bondholders during acquisitions.25  
Specification (7) again introduces traditional bondholder liquidity, while specification (8) 
finds a positive relationship with acquirer equity.  Pervasive negative acquirer equity 
returns correlated (uncorrelated) with acquirer bondholder (target security) returns 
support the wealth destruction hypothesis. 
Overall, multivariate analyses in Table 5 show significantly lower bondholder returns 
for acquirers with older credit ratings but no effect from merger restriction covenants.  
Acquirers making bigger deals and paying with more cash experience lower returns, but 
the wealth transfer hypothesis to target securities is not supported.  Target bondholders 
benefit from coinsurance effects when an acquirer has higher credit ratings.  
Table 6 documents individual bond returns around acquisitions.  Specifications (1) 
through (5) explain variation in acquirer bonds with various fixed effects and additional 
controls.  Older firm credit ratings are again associated with lower returns, however, 
several individual bond characteristics are also significant.  The positive coefficient on 
Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread suggests that individual bond returns are also responsive to 
traditional liquidity.  Similarly, there is weak evidence that higher coupon (senior) bonds 
perform worse (better) than others.  Deal size, industrial diversification, and eventual 
withdrawal all have the expected effect at varying levels of statistical significance.  
                                                     
25 Since there is no way to observe deals that are not proposed due to the presence of merger restriction covenants, this result does not 
necessarily mean that merger restriction covenants are ineffective during mergers.  An interaction term between withdrawn deal 
dummy and the merger restriction covenants variable is insignificant in an unreported specification.  Since there are only 
approximately 30 withdrawn deals with bond returns, small sample size presents difficulties in determining whether or not the presence 
of merger restriction covenants leads to the withdrawal of deals detrimental to shareholders. 
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<Insert Table 6> 
Multivariate results for individual target bonds are shown in specifications (6) 
through (8) of Table 6. While these specifications are limited by small sample size (less 
than 200 individual bonds), the results show similar negative effects from older credit 
ratings but higher returns for bonds with greater ex-ante liquidity.26  Interestingly, 
specifications (7) and (8) suggest that only target bondholders benefit when event 
restriction covenants are present. In contrast to individual acquirer bonds, higher coupon 
and junior bonds perform better, the latter reinforcing the coinsurance effect.  Similarly, 
putable target bonds may exhibit underperformance because coinsurance via acquisition 
makes default components of the put option less valuable. 
Table 6 shows that both traditional and agency-based liquidity influence individual 
bondholder returns.  The presence of merger restriction covenants benefits only 
bondholders of targets, not acquirers. Lower coupon and senior bonds outperform 
(underperform) for acquirers (targets), while put provisions weaken target bondholder 
gains.  These results indicate that both firm-level and individual bond characteristics 
influence returns to acquirer bondholders. 
 4.1.2 Common Equity Repurchases 
Drivers of firm aggregate bondholder returns around common equity repurchases are 
presented in Panel A of Table 7.  Columns (1) through (3) display base specifications with 
various fixed effects and controls.  Reiterating the univariate results, credit rating age 
enters negative and highly significant (1% level or better).  Larger firms, higher ex-ante 
risk firms (Implied Volatility), and firms with shorter bond maturity experience greater 
bondholder losses.  While negative abnormal cash bond returns around repurchases in 
                                                     
26 In unreported specifications, I use bond age as an alternative traditional liquidity proxy for both acquirer and target bonds only to 
find similar results. 
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Table 4 support a leveraging effect, multivariate analyses of bond excess returns around 
equity repurchases may reveal a signaling effect.  Coefficients on equity CAR in columns 
(4) and (6) of Table 7, however, are positive but of little to no significance.  Similar to the 
firm aggregate acquirer bond results, coefficients of Bonds Relative Bid-Ask Spread and 
Cov Ratio: Payout Policy incorporated in specifications (4) through (6) are also 
insignificant. 
<Insert Table 7> 
Panel B examines individual bond returns around repurchases.  Similar to Panel A, 
illiquidity from greater credit rating age lowers individual bond returns throughout each 
specification.  Illiquidity effects of Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread are also seen in 
specifications (4) through (6).  There is weak evidence that bonds with limited debt 
covenants and collateral (Bond Secured) perform better.  Given that an equity repurchase 
removes cash from the firm’s assets and reduces overall firm collateral quality, it is not 
surprising to see bonds without specific collateral underperform.  Subsequently withdrawn 
repurchases reduce returns by between 14 and 51 basis points, though the results are not 
statistically significant after the inclusion of firm fixed effects in specification (3).  Finally, 
while negative univariate bond returns around repurchases in Table 4 suggest that a 
leveraging effect dominates, the positive and weakly significant signs on both Repurchase 
Size and Equity CAR s provide some evidence of a counterbalancing signaling effect. 
Results in Table 7 indicate that lower credit rating-based and traditional liquidity 
reduce individual bond returns around common equity repurchases.  Bonds of larger firms 
with riskier assets and shorter bond maturity underperform, while greater collateral 
backing of secured bonds provides protection.  Bond and equity returns exhibit a positive 
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relationship, providing some support for counterbalance between signaling and leveraging 
effects. 
 4.1.3 Seasoned Equity Offerings 
Table 8 displays SEO multivariate analyses of cash bond returns.  Panel A reports 
firm aggregate bond returns and indicates the same effect for older credit ratings.  S&P 
Credit Rating level itself is also consistently negative, providing weak support for 
univariate results in Table 4 that high yield firm bondholders see relative benefits of 
SEOs.  Firms with higher market equity, leverage below target, and shorter bond 
maturity exhibit higher bond returns.  Similar to the other two events, greater presence of 
related covenants (Cov Ratio: Limited Debt) does not influence bondholder returns.  The 
coefficient on SEO Size is positive and highly significant.  Given that SEO bondholder 
returns from Table 4 are generally not different from zero, it is not possible to attribute 
SEO Size to deleveraging or signaling using cash bond prices.  The positive coefficients on 
Equity CAR in specifications (4) through (6), however, provide weak initial evidence of 
signaling. Please note that, with only 153 observations in specification (6), SEO sample 
sizes are substantially smaller than for the other two corporate events but are comparable 
to the 189 (1980-1992 time period) and 99 (1990-2002) observations in Ebberhart and 
Siddique (2002) and Elliott, Prevost, and Rao (2009) respectively. 
<Insert Table 8> 
Turning to individual bond returns around SEOs in Panel B, credit rating level and 
age effects are similar to Panel A.  Putable bonds underperform in specification (6), an 
SEO deleveraging result analogous to acquisition coinsurance default risk reduction. SEO 
Size is again positive and highly significant throughout each specification.  The signaling 
effect of Equity CAR in specifications (5) and (6) is stronger than the firm aggregate 
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specifications.  However, given the persistent and strong influence of liquidity risk, 
particularly risk related to less recently revised or reiterated credit ratings found in all 
three events, examination of credit default swap spread changes may not agree with these 
cash bond results.  
SEO multivariate results displayed in Table 8 indicate that larger issues lead to 
higher bondholder returns, consistent with the deleveraging effect.  Embedded puts 
become less valuable with deleveraging.  Coefficients on equity returns, however, suggest 
that a signaling effect may also be present.  Bonds of firms with higher and less recently 
revised credit ratings underperform, while greater presence of limited debt covenants does 
little to protect bondholders. 
 4.2 Credit Default Swaps and the Basis Credit Ratio 
To mitigate the influence of liquidity effects, excess credit default swap (CDS) 
changes are reported in column (1) of Table 9. Acquirer firms shown in Panel A1 exhibit 
statistically significant (at the 10% level or better) excess CDS spreads increases in all 
three samples.  Assuming five year credit duration, this primary sample spread increase of 
0.757 basis points translates into a default driven bond price change of -0.0378%, an 
amount less than 1/8 of -0.313% in Table 4.  These results show that, while default risk 
does increase for acquirers, the change is very small relative to that implied by the cash 
bond market.  Acquirer CDS spreads contract during the financial crisis and expand 
significantly in the following 2010-2014 period.  Both deals with only cash payment and 
those involving public targets are also associated with higher CDS spreads.  Unlike cash 
bond results, no significant cross-sectional non-parametric differences on S&P Credit 
Rating Age can be seen. 
<Insert Table 9> 
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Column (2) of Table 9 displays firm aggregate changes in the CDS-bond basis.  The 
basis increases by 0.59 basis points (significant at the 10% level) in the primary sample.  
Holding CDS spread constant, this implies a positive shock to bond market liquidity (i.e. 
the basis increases because bond spreads decline more than CDS spreads).  Cross-sectional 
differences suggest that non-industrials and firms with more liquid CDS markets 
experience bigger increases around acquisitions. To examine the size of the basis change 
relative to the cash bond spread change, basis credit ratio (BCR) results are presented in 
column (3).  Primary sample median BCR indicates that 51.1% of changes to bondholders 
are driven by liquidity.   Median BCR is also exclusively negative in every cross-section 
and is significantly lower (at the 5% level) for non-industrial acquirers and those with no 
bank debt.  Recalling Table 1, significantly negative BCR implies that an increase in 
default risk expressed by lower (higher) bond prices (spreads) is less likely.  
Consequentially, the presence of small increases in acquirer default risk can only be 
confirmed by directly examining CDS spread changes. 
For completeness, I include CDS spread changes, CDS-bond basis changes, and BCR 
for target firms in Panel A2.  Target CDS spreads are available during the event window 
for only 45 out of 1345 public targets with some debt.  Median CDS spreads for targets 
decline significantly (at the 5% level or better), reiterating the cash bond results. Though 
changes in the CDS-bond basis and the BCR are not significant in any of the three 
samples, sample sizes are limited.  Changes in the basis exhibit substantial time series 
variation and are significantly lower for investment grade targets. 
Common equity repurchasing firm CDS spread and CDS-bond basis univariate 
statistics are presented in Panel B of Table 9.  Contrary to cash bond returns in Table 4, 
none of the samples exhibit CDS spread changes different from zero in column (1).  CDS 
spread increases occur in only two cross-sections: the 2002-2006 time period and 
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repurchases with above median bond trading volume.  In short, there is no change in 
default risk around repurchases.  Liquidity risk, however, is large and significant.  Median 
CDS-bond basis changes in column (2) are significant (at the 5% level) in all three 
samples.  The basis decreases more when ex-ante CDS spread levels and liquidity are 
higher.  The magnitude of basis changes relative to total bond spread changes is 
substantial: BCRs in column (3) are statistically significant at the 1% level or better 
across all three samples.  The results show that roughly 70% of bondholder wealth 
changes around repurchases are due to liquidity.  This significantly negative BCR dispels 
the notion that repurchasing firm bondholder returns are due to increases in default risk. 
Panel C presents univariate statistics for CDS spread and basis changes for seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs).  Spread changes are exclusively negative and often significant 
throughout the cross-sections.  Column (1) shows that median (mean) CDS spread 
declines by nearly 3 (17) basis points in the primary sample.  Similar to repurchases, CDS 
spreads decline more for firms with higher ex-ante CDS spread levels and liquidity.  Mean 
decline in CDS spread is nearly five times larger for high yield issuers, though only 37 
observations are present.  Changes in the CDS-bond basis are negative but are generally 
insignificant.  However, SEOs with both cash bond and CDS data are limited, as can be 
seen by some cross-sections with fewer than 40 observations.  Median BCR is negative 
and relatively large (50.9% of total bond spread changes) and indicates that liquidity risk 
is comparable to default risk around SEOs. 
<Insert Figure 2> 
To contrast different measures of default risk and examine the role of liquidity, I 
present visual evidence in Figure 2.  Columns (1), (2) and (3) show time series variation 
for Standard & Poor’s credit ratings, 5 year credit default swap spreads, and cash bond z-
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spreads respectively. To clarify, lower (higher) CDS/bond spreads (credit ratings) are 
associated with less default risk and vice versa. Acquirers and repurchases exhibit no 
change in credit rating during the 30 calendar days before and after the event, while SEOs 
exhibit a very small downtrend beginning 5 days after the issuance. In aggregate, credit 
ratings contain little to no timely information regarding the corporate event. Column (2) 
shows a small increase in CDS spread at acquisition date, consistent with univariate 
results. Repurchases exhibit a slight upward trend over the entire time series, but little 
change at repurchase date, while SEOs show a substantial downward trend in spreads 
along with a small decrease at the issue date.  The variation within CDS spreads suggests 
that timely information about firm default risk is incorporated around these events.  
Lastly, column (3) displays time series of cash bond z-spreads.  Acquisitions and 
repurchases contain substantial noise in the form of liquidity, while SEOs exhibit a similar 
downward trend despite this noise. 
With differences between corporate credit measurements at center, the primary 
takeaway from Table 9 and Figure 2 is clear across all three transaction types: credit 
ratings (no noise, but no signal), cash bonds (signal with noise), and CDS spreads (signal 
with no noise) can provide very different results regarding changes in default risk around 
corporate events.  Contrary to cash bond results in Table 4, Table 9 indicates that 
acquisitions slightly increase default risk, repurchases have no effect, and SEOs 
substantially reduce default risk.  
 4.2.1 Drivers of Firm Default Risk around Corporate Events 
Similar to the bond return analyses in section 4.1, I present CDS spread multivariate 
specifications for acquisitions in Table 10.  Contrary to bond analyses, I use log 
transformed pre-event CDS spreads in place of numeric credit ratings when CDS spread 
changes are the dependent variables. While CDS specifications have smaller sample size 
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than bond returns in Table 5, weakly significant coefficients on Acquirer Equity CAR 
again provide some support for wealth destruction (lower equity returns and greater 
default risk reflected in higher CDS spreads).  Subsequently withdrawn deals also show 
increases in CDS spreads.  For comparison purposes, I include specifications with excess z-
spread changes in columns (5) through (8).27  Surprisingly, coefficients on Log(S&P Credit 
Rating Age) are negative (opposite the direction of bond returns in Tables 5 and 6) but 
statistically insignificant.  With the exception of Relative Size in columns (5) and (6) and 
Implied Volatility in specification (8), no significant coefficients are present. 
<Insert Table 10> 
Multivariate analyses of credit spreads around common equity repurchases are 
displayed in Table 11.  Specifications (1) through (3) examine CDS spread changes and 
show that smaller, less risky firms with longer bond maturity see small, but mainly 
insignificant, increases in default risk.  Open market repurchases and subsequently 
withdrawn repurchases show similar effects.  Equity CAR and Excess Leverage are both 
insignificant, which, combined with the insignificant overall sample CDS spread changes, 
suggests that signaling and leveraging effects may be counterbalancing. Specifications (4) 
through (6) use excess z-spreads as the dependent variable and again show the consistent 
and significant (at the 5% level) liquidity effect of untimely credit ratings on increased 
cash bond spreads (lower returns). 
<Insert Table 11> 
Table 12 presents credit spread multivariate analyses for SEOs.  Smaller sample sizes 
(only 94 observations with control data) are seen in specifications (1) through (3).  Highly 
                                                     
27 As previously noted, Bond Premium/Discount is added in these specifications to adjust for bond spread calculation method (z-spread 
versus PEC spread) with respect to basis trades. 
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significant coefficients Equity CAR and adjusted Implied Volatility suggest a signaling 
effect. However, significant univariate decreases in CDS spreads and SEO Size also 
support a general deleveraging effect and a relieving operating cash infusion of DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010).  Negative Market/Book Ratio coefficients provide weak 
support for market timing as well.  Specifications (4) through (6) using bond spreads offer 
somewhat different results.  While larger SEOs again have lower credit spreads, Equity 
CAR coefficients are positive and weakly significant.  Greater presence of limited debt 
covenants, as was the case for the covenants specific to acquirers in Table 10 and 
repurchases in Table 11, has little impact on either CDS or cash bond spreads in Table 
12.  With respect to liquidity, older credit ratings and lower ex-ante bond bid-ask spreads 
both significantly increase bond spreads, but no analogous effect is seen from CDS 
liquidity. 
<Insert Table 12> 
Overall, multivariate spread change analyses in Table 10, 11, and 12 confirm wealth 
destruction effects around acquisitions, counterbalancing signaling and leveraging effects 
of repurchases, and predominantly deleveraging effects of SEOs partially offset by 
signaling.  Both repurchasing and SEO-issuing firm z-spreads increase if older S&P credit 
ratings are present.  Differences in the drivers of event related CDS and bond spread 
changes are observable.  Bond spreads do not reflect eventual withdrawal of acquisitions 
and repurchases.  For ex-ante riskier firms, only CDS spreads exhibit significant declines. 
 4.2.2 CDS-Bond Basis and Liquidity 
Given the aforementioned differences between cash and derivative credit markets, 
how does liquidity in each market influence the CDS-bond basis?  If event-related changes 
in CDS market liquidity are driving changes in the CDS-bond basis, then the widely 
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accepted notion that CDS markets better capture default risk may be called into question.  
Despite significant increases in CDS spread levels around leveraged buyouts, Acharya and 
Johnson (2007) find little LBO-related impact on CDS bid-ask spreads.  To examine this 
possibility during acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs, I present visual evidence in the 
form of time series multi-market spread and CDS-bond basis levels 30 calendar days prior 
to and after these corporate events in Figure 3.   
<Insert Figure 3> 
Column (1) of Figure 3 includes CDS and equity bid-ask spreads.  There is 
substantial noise in each of the time series.  CDS bid-ask spreads in row (a) appear to 
decline at the acquisition event but quickly revert back to prior levels.  No change in CDS 
liquidity is observable around repurchases.  SEO CDS bid-ask spreads appear to spike up 
but also revert. Column (2) displays overlays of CDS and firm aggregate bond-bid ask 
spreads.  Bond spreads do not exhibit any observable change around the event date 
relative to noise in the entire time series and no correlation is easily seen between the two 
time series. In fact, unreported results show that bond and CDS bid-ask spreads are 
actually negatively correlated (uncorrelated) during acquisitions and repurchase (SEO) 
event windows.  Column (3) of Figure 3 displays time series of the CDS-bond basis itself.  
While the basis appears to trend upward following an SEO, no movement around the 
event date can be found for repurchases and acquisitions.  Similar to cash bond spreads in 
Figure 2, noise in the basis throughout the time series is substantial, suggesting than any 
changes in the CDS-bond basis during the event window may have significant 
idiosyncratic components. 
<Insert Table 13> 
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To demonstrate this more formally, Table 13 further examines the drivers of the 
CDS-bond basis in a multivariate setting. Pooled regressions with event fixed effects are 
presented in columns (1) and (2).28  Specification (2) includes firm level variables in prior 
literature known to impact the CDS-bond basis including collateral (Asset Tangibility), 
leverage, and firm-aggregated bond Premium/Discount.  Surprisingly, Log(S&P Credit 
Rating Age) is insignificant in all specifications.  Only relative bid-ask spreads in cash 
bond markets appear to have any influence CDS-bond basis: traditional bond market 
illiquidity drives the basis lower.  This effect is largest during acquisitions in specifications 
(3) and (4) but consistent in sign through repurchases and SEOs.  However, neither CDS 
nor CDS-bond market liquidity interaction have any consistent effect on event related 
changes in the CDS-bond basis. 
Together, Table 13 and Figure 3 present multivariate analysis of CDS-bond basis 
changes and contrast time series with traditional liquidity measures.  Similar to bid-ask 
spreads in transacting firm equity, cash bonds, and credit default swaps, the CDS-bond 
basis exhibits substantial time series variation.  Importantly, only bond market liquidity 
significantly influences event related changes in the basis.   
5 Economic Significance 
5.1 Total (Bond Spread) versus Liquidity (CDS-Bond Basis) 
Having demonstrated that corporate event related credit quality changes can differ 
in statistical significance based on the choice of credit instrument, better understanding 
the economic magnitude of these differences will be helpful to corporate creditors.  In 
section 2.2 and section 4.2 respectively, I describe theoretically and show empirically how 
                                                     
28 Following Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013), I also include a time noise risk factor in unreported specifications but find the results 
unchanged. 
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basis credit ratios (BCRs) during these events can explain the magnitude of CDS-bond 
basis changes relative to total bond spread changes.  To examine this further, I scale 
excess z-spread and CDS-bond basis changes by firm book debt value and price-weighted 
duration of that debt to estimate overall cash bond and liquidity-only wealth effects for 
creditors.29  The results are shown in Figure 4.  Notice that liquidity variation in column 
(b) is generally larger than in column (a), particularly for acquisitions and repurchases.  
Disregarding 2009, mean cash bond wealth changes are essentially zero for acquisitions 
which liquidity wealth effects are slightly larger.  In the case of common equity 
repurchases, excess changes in cash bond spreads from 2006-2014 reflect a net gain of $2 
billion, while the net loss attributable to liquidity effects is three times as large.  In the 
last row, liquidity losses underestimate default risk reduction SEO bond wealth gains 
during the financial crisis.  In short, when accounting for firm liability size and sensitivity 
to credit spread changes, liquidity remains a massive component of creditor wealth effects.  
<Insert Figure 4> 
 These economically large CDS-bond basis changes, however, are not inconsistent 
with limits to arbitrage in credit markets as documented by Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, 
and Mahanti (2011) and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013).  Consider the corporate credit 
spread change due to these corporate events in relationship to transaction costs.  Schultz 
(2001) finds that round trip trading costs for corporate bonds average 27 basis points from 
1995 to 1997.  Even assuming that round trip transactions costs in the cash bond market 
have reduced by two-thirds in the last 15 years, costs exceed mean primary sample CDS-
bond basis changes in column (2) of Panel B in Table 9 by 385%.  Firms with greater 
numbers of bond issues will incur even higher transactions costs. 
                                                     
29 Since market prices are not available for all firm debt instruments and firm issuance of multiple 6-digit CUSIP debt instruments is 
not uncommon (particularly for financial firms), using book value of debt is a more complete measure of economic significance. 
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Similarly, transactions costs in CDS markets relative to corporate event spread 
changes are also large. A recent working paper by Biswas, Nikolova, and Stahel (2015) 
finds that round trip effective spreads in single-name CDS transactions from dealers to 
non-dealer market participants range from 27.6 to 45.8 basis points.  This cost is at least 
1.6 (9.5) times the mean (median) SEO CDS spread change in column (1) of Panel C in 
Table 9.  As a Bloomberg derived measure of CDS liquidity, median (mean) quoted bid-
ask spreads in Table 3 for CDS contracts in the primary sample are 6.33 (10.883), 5.42 
(11.306), and 10.72 (27.30) basis points respectively for acquisitions, repurchases, and 
SEOs.  The magnitudes of these credit market bid-ask spreads represent the bulk of the 
CDS-bond basis changes in column (2) of Table 9.  With respect to transactions costs in 
either market, corporate event related changes in CDS-bond basis are small and leave any 
potential arbitrage opportunities difficult to implement.   
5.2 Default (CDS Spread) versus Equity 
Comparing credit related bondholder to shareholder wealth effects around corporate 
events disregarding market frictions may lead to conclusions that the former are large 
relative to the latter.  Changes in default risk captured by credit default swap spreads 
mitigate this issue.  To explore this further, I present visual evidence in Figure 5 
comparing CDS derived gains/losses to creditors and shareholders.  Similar to the excess 
z-spread transformation in the previous section, I calculate CDS Based Mean Credit Gain 
[Loss] using CDS spread change and plot annual time series gains/losses in column (a).  
Equity Value Gain [Loss] is the transacting firm stock excess return times the pre-event 
announcement firm market capitalization (in 2014 dollars) presented in column (b).    
<Insert Figure 5> 
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Much larger equity variation is observed in column (b) of Figure 5, with two notable 
extraordinary exceptions for acquisitions (2008) and SEOs (2009-2010).  For acquisitions 
displayed in the first row, the mean loss to acquirer equity holders (creditors) for deals 
from 2002 to 2014 in the primary sample is $128.5 ($32.97) million.  Not including 2008, a 
year skewed by extremely large financial deals including J.P. Morgan’s acquisition of Bear 
Stearns and Bank of America’s merger with Merrill Lynch, CDS-based acquisition-related 
wealth changes accruing to creditors result in a mean gain of $16.23 million.  For common 
equity repurchases, stockholders gain an average of $254 million over the 2002-2014 
period, while creditors experience a gain of only $15.79 million.  Like acquisitions, SEO 
observations are highly influenced by the financial crisis period.  While there is more 
variability in column (b) of the third row in Figure 5, large gains to creditors occur 
primarily around 2009.  For the entire time period, SEO issuing stockholders lose an 
average of $168.9 million while creditors gain $637.8 million.  While this evidence may 
add further support for an SEO deleveraging wealth transfer effect, consider that financial 
slack from SEOs issued around the financial crisis provided substantial relief to creditors.  
Discarding 2009-2010 SEOs, mean losses to shareholders are $171.7 million and creditors 
experience mean losses of $19.75 million.  Overall, across all three transaction types, this 
CDS-based evidence suggests that the economic magnitude of gains/losses to shareholders 
is generally much larger than creditor losses resulting solely from changes in default risk 
due to these corporate events. 
6 Robustness 
6.1 Additional Specifications 
 It is possible that the results presented herein are limited by credit rating 
benchmark granularity mismatching and/or event window selection.   First, recall that 
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Markit corporate CDS indices are only available for investment grade and high yield, as 
opposed to credit rating level specific groups.30  To be consistent across credit 
instruments, bond returns are also adjusted by investment grade/high yield indices with 
three maturity levels.  Prior fixed income event studies, particularly Billett, King, and 
Mauer (2004), use as many as 9 credit rating dimensions.  While multivariate tests control 
for both credit rating and bond maturity, this presents the possibility that more 
significantly negative cash bond excess returns, relative to CDS spread changes, may be 
driven by less specific benchmarks for a particular credit rating level.  To address this 
possibility, I reproduce Table 4 to include credit rating cross-sections for excess bond 
returns; the results are displayed in Table 4A of the appendix.  Similarly for Table 9, 
excess CDS spread changes, CDS-bond basis changes, and basis credit ratios by credit 
rating are included in Table 9A.  Though some non-parametric significant differences 
between rating categories are shown, signs are generally consistent in each event column 
and there is no discernable pattern across event types suggesting a bias present in a 
specific credit rating category. 
Because Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) find that the CDS market anticipates 
negative credit events, I also extend the event window to [-15,+15] and recalculate 
univariate statistics for cash bond returns, CDS spread changes, and CDS-bond basis 
changes.  The results are similar; they are included in Table 14 of the appendix.  I also 
include various cross-sections of returns on the standard [-1,+1] event window used 
throughout the literature.  While differences between the cross-sections are generally less 
significant, the distinction between bond returns, CDS spread changes, and the relative 
                                                     
30 Though prior forms of the Markit CDX index have existed since 2001, CDX investment grade (high yield) index historical data are 
available in Bloomberg from 2003 (2007). In 2009, S&P/ISDA launched investment grade and high yield corporate CDS indices with 
two additional sub-indices and introduced industry CDS indices the following year.  For an extended history of CDS indices, see Sector 
Credit Default Swap Indices via ETF.com at http://europe.etf.com/europe/publications/journal-of-indexes/articles/8370-sector-credit-
default-swap-indices.html?fullart=1&start=5  
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magnitude of CDS-bond basis changes (including unreported BCRs) are similar to those 
constructed on a [-5,+1] event window. 
6.2 Representativeness 
CDS spread and CDS-bond basis sample sizes, particularly for the SEO cross-
sections, may limit the power of some empirical tests.  As a test of robustness to small 
sample size, whenever possible, I replicate the regressions of Tables 5 through 8 and 10 
through 13 using bootstrapped standard errors clustered on event year and find these 
untabulated results to be similar to those reported.  There are also some corporate CDS 
contracts for which historical prices are not available via Bloomberg.31  Addressing the 
academic market, Markit began providing CDS data directly via Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS) in January 2013.  Markit, like Bloomberg, also uses quote and price 
aggregation among dealers and both are likely representative of overall CDS daily market 
activity.32  However, my preliminary analysis suggests that, while Markit data include 
50% more CDS reference entities than Bloomberg, the vast majority of these additional 
CDS contracts have infrequently updated quotes and limited price discovery.  These 
incremental data points, therefore, will be less useful in an event study. 
With respect to representation by industry, Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu 
(2009) suggest that coverage in the CDS market is concentrated in utility firms (SIC code 
49xx).  Utilities represent 6.43%, 3.13%, and 20.57% of the primary samples of 
acquisitions, repurchases, and SEOs respectively.  This compares to 4.19%, 1.54%, and 
6.82% for full sample firms with some debt, suggesting utility overrepresentation is 
present for SEOs.  For corporate events involving financial firms (SIC code 6xxx), 
primary sample (full sample) representations are 24.60%, 21.72%, and 30.10% (30.96%, 
                                                     
31 There are also instances when historical CDS-bond basis data are available from Bloomberg but CDS spreads are not and vice versa. 
32 Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak (2014) use both Bloomberg and Markit CDS inception date data and find no differences in their results.   
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27.53%, and 29.59%) respectively.  However, significantly higher CDS spread changes are 
observable in the financial and utility cross section only for acquirers in Table 9 and 
financial and utility SIC code indicator variables added to specification (1) in Table 10 
enter insignificantly (untabulated). 
<Insert Figure 6> 
To further explore any industry biases, I present relative frequency histograms of 2-
digit SIC codes by corporate event in Figure 6.  The first chart shows that primary 
sample acquisitions are substantially underrepresented in business services (SIC code 73, -
5.73%).  Repurchases have fewer depository institutions (i.e. commercial banks; 60, -
11.01%).  SEOs are underrepresented in chemicals (28, -5.9%) and business services (73, -
5.01%) while overrepresented in utilities (49, 13.05%) and liquid energy pipelines (46, 
5.13%).  Representation extends beyond utilities in each of the events, emphasizing the 
need to control for industry effects when using CDS spreads in corporate event studies.   
Substantial size reduction from the All Events to primary and CDS-bond samples 
suggests that the argument of Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009), in which 
CDS trading simply does not occur for a sufficiently high number of corporate entities, is 
somewhat applicable.  If smaller firms with less liquid credit markets exhibit substantially 
different event-related credit returns than firms with traded CDS contracts, this will limit 
the generalizability of my results.  However, the largest firms with public debt represent 
the greatest economic impact of corporate event activity and are increasingly predominant 
throughout single name CDS markets.33  Additionally, if CDS liquidity declines, due to 
                                                     
33 Saretto and Tookes (2013) show that the number of S&P 500 member firms with available debt information and active CDS markets 
increases from 23.4% in 2002 to 64.7% by 2010. 
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regulatory actions such as naked CDS bans,34 then event studies using CDS data in future 
time periods may present even greater challenges. 
7 Conclusion 
Through the use of both cash bond returns and credit default swap (CDS) spread 
changes, I examine changes in default risk around acquisitions, common equity 
repurchases, and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).  Largely consistent with prior studies, 
firm aggregate price-weighted cash bond returns from 2002-2014 suggest significant 
increases in default risk resulting from acquisitions and common equity repurchases and 
no significant change from SEOs.  The presence of event-specific covenants does nothing 
to influence excess bond returns.  Rather, lower bondholder returns are driven by liquidity 
risk, both in traditional (bid-ask spreads, etc.) and market structure (credit rating age) 
forms. 
The single instrument simplicity, lack of subjectivity, and enhanced liquidity of 
CDSs presents a far more useful tool than cash bonds for determining how corporate 
events influence default risk.  CDS spreads exhibit small changes in default risk for 
acquisitions, no change around repurchases, and large decreases following SEOs. These 
results differ from cash bonds and provide support for acquisition wealth destruction, 
repurchase signal/leveraging counterbalances, and deleveraging effects of SEOs.  As CDS 
contracts move to central clearing houses, resulting in greater levels of transparency and 
trading activity, it is likely that CDS-based corporate event studies will be even more 
widely available and informative.   
 While firm managers engage in these corporate transactions to optimize shareholder 
value, they must also evaluate deviations from optimal financing policy expressed by 
                                                     
34 See Analysis: ‘Naked’ CDS Ban and Eurozone Calm via Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/17/us-investment-
nakedcds-idUSBRE93G05Q20130417). 
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changes in firm default risk.  Misattributing largely uncontrollable credit market liquidity 
risk to default risk can thereby influence managerial decisions. To measure this liquidity 
effect, I examine changes in the CDS-bond basis and the basis credit ratio (BCR).  
Changes driven by liquidity are large relative to total bond spread changes (50-70%), 
emphasizing the need for managers and investors to more accurately identify event related 
changes in firm default risk.  
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Figure 1 
Impact of Credit Market Liquidity on Corporate Events 
 
Negative Credit Shock from Corporate Event without Change in CDS-Bond Basis 
 Negative Credit Shock (Pictured) → ∆cdst = cdst+j − cdst−i > 0    ∆zsprt = zsprt+j − zsprt−i > 0 Positive Credit Shock (Not Pictured) → ∆cdst = cdst+j − cdst−i < 0    ∆zsprt = zsprt+j − zsprt−i < 0 ∆basist = ∆cdst − ∆zsprt = 0 
 
Negative Credit Shock from Corporate Event with Change in CDS-Bond Basis 
 
 Negative Bond Liquidity Shock (Pictured) → ∆basist = ∆cdst − ∆zsprt < Positive Bond Liquidity Shock (Not Pictured) → ∆basist = ∆cdst − ∆zsprt > 0 
 
Absent Credit Shock from Corporate Event with Change in CDS-Bond Basis 
 
 Negative Bond Liquidity Shock (Pictured) → ∆basist = ∆cdst − ∆zsprt < 0 ∆cdst = cdst+j − cdst−i = 0        ∆zsprt = zsprt+j − zsprt−i > 0 Positive Bond Liquidity Shock (Not Pictured) → ∆basist = ∆cdst − ∆zsprt > 0 ∆cdst = cdst+j − cdst−i = 0        ∆zsprt = zsprt+j − zsprt−i < 0 
 
Time series in Figure 1 are simulated using CDS-bond basis, cash bond spread, and CDS daily spread noise of 0.25 bps, a CDS-basis 
bond liquidity shock of -5 basis points, and a CDS credit spread shock of +5 basis points on the event window [t-j, t+j]. 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
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Figure 2 
Credit Quality around Corporate Events 
Column (1) displays calendar day time series (and 95% confidence intervals) of Standard & Poor’s numerical credit rating (according to Odders-White and Ready 
(2006)) around (a) acquisitions (acquirers only), (b) common equity repurchases, and (c) seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 2002 through 2014 at transaction 
announcement date t = 0.  Columns (2) and (3) display 5-year Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread and cash bond z-spread (zero volatility spread) levels respectively 
from Bloomberg in basis points.  Only events with available Bloomberg CDS tickers (primary sample) in the 2002-2014 time period are displayed. 
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Figure 3 
Liquidity around Corporate Events 
Column (1) displays relative bid-ask spread for both credit default swap (CDS) and equity markets around, (a) acquisitions (acquirers only), (b) common equity 
repurchases, and (c) seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 2002 through 2014 at transaction announcement date t = 0.  Column (2) displays CDS and firm-
aggregated bond relative bid-ask spreads.  Column (3) shows the CDS-bond basis from Bloomberg in basis points, calculated as the interpolated CDS spread minus z-
spread.  Only events with available Bloomberg CDS tickers (primary sample) in the 2002-2014 time period are displayed. 
 (1) CDS (Left) & Equity (Right) Bid-Ask Spreads (2) CDS (Left) & Bonds Bid-Ask Spreads (Right) (3) CDS-Bond Basis (in bps) 
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Figure 4 
Overall and Liquidity-Only Creditor Wealth Effects of Corporate Events by Year 
(a) Overall: Cash Bond Z-Spread (b) Liquidity: CDS-Bond Basis 
  
  
  
  
  
Column (a) presents event credit wealth effect using cash bond z-spreads (Value Gain/Loss) for each corporate event 
type.  Cash bond based spread change is calculated for each firm as the issue price weighted excess z-spread change 
(winsorized at the 1% level) obtained from Bloomberg scaled by total firm debt (book value) and firm price weighted 
bond duration to produce the credit gain (loss) values. The CDS-bond basis (interpolated CDS spread minus z-spread) 
change is scaled by total firm debt and firm price weighted bond duration to produce CDS-bond basis change wealth 
effects in column (b).  Only transactions (acquirers only for acquisitions) for firms with Bloomberg CDS tickers (primary 
sample) during the 2006-2014 time period are shown.  All spread changes are constructed on a [-5,+1] event window.  
All results are displayed in 2014 USD. 
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Figure 5 
CDS-based Credit and Equity Wealth Effects by Year 
(a) (b) 
  
  
  
  
  
Column (a) presents event credit wealth effect using credit default swaps (CDS)  (value  gain/loss) calculated for each 
firm as the credit index adjusted CDS spread change (winsorized at the 1% level) obtained from Bloomberg over the 
return window [-5,+1].  The spread change is scaled by total firm debt (book value) and firm price weighted bond 
duration to produce the credit gain (loss) values in column (a).  Equity wealth effect in column (b) is calculated as the 
four-factor Fama-French adjusted excess return (winsorized at the 1% level) on the event window [-5,+1] times the 
firm’s market capitalization at the beginning of the event window.  Only transactions (acquirers only for acquisitions) 
for firms with Bloomberg CDS tickers (primary sample) during the 2002-2014 time period are shown.  All results are 
displayed in 2014 USD. 
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Figure 6 
Corporate Event Representation by Industry 
 
 
 
Acquirer, common equity repurchasing firm, and SEO firm percent representation by 2-digit SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification) code for all transactions with debt according to Capital IQ (black checkered bars), transactions with 
Bloomberg CDS tickers (primary sample, light blue bars with horizontal filling lines), and transactions with CDS spread 
and bond data available in the event window (CDS-Bond subsample, solid red bars) are shown above.  The most over 
and under-represented industries for the CDS-bond subsample are displayed for each event type. 
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Table 1 
Basis Credit Ratio (BCR) 
BCR = ∆CDS-Bond Basis∆Bond Spread  ∆Basis < 0 (Negative Liquidity Shock) ∆Basis = 0 (No Liquidity Shock) ∆Basis > 0 (Positive Liquidity Shock) 
∆Bond Spread < 0 
 
Decreased Default 
Risk? 
0 < BCR < ∞ 
More Likely as Ratio Increases: 
Decreasing bond spreads and decreasing 
basis are due to CDS spreads decreasing 
in greater magnitude relative to bond 
spreads, indicating that default risk is 
actually decreasing 
 
BCR = 0 
Yes: Bond spreads correctly show 
decreased default risk 
-∞ < BCR < 0 
Less Likely as Ratio Decreases: As 
ratio decreases, reduced liquidity risk 
dominates reduced default risk and bond 
spreads become less reliable.  Default risk 
may actually increase if BCR is 
significantly less than -1 (CDS spreads 
increase more than bond spreads decrease) 
 
∆Bond Spread = 0 
 
No Change in 
Default Risk? 
BCR Undefined 
No: Basis has declined due to lower CDS 
spread.  Default risk has decreased 
BCR Undefined 
Yes: Bond spreads correctly show no 
change in default risk 
BCR Undefined 
No: Basis has increased due to higher 
CDS spread.  Default risk has increased 
∆Bond Spread > 0 
 
Increased Default 
Risk? 
-∞ < BCR < 0 
Less Likely As Ratio Decreases: As 
ratio decreases, increased liquidity risk 
dominates increased default risk and bond 
spreads become less reliable.  Default risk 
may actually decrease if BCR is 
significantly less than -1 (CDS spreads 
decrease more than bond spreads increase) 
 
Note: BCR in  Figure 1c < BCR in Figure 
1b < 0 
BCR = 0 
Yes: Bond spreads correctly show 
increased default risk 
 
Note: See Figure 1a 
0 < BCR < ∞ 
More Likely as Ratio Increases: 
Increasing bond spreads and increasing 
basis are due to CDS spreads increasing in 
greater magnitude relative to bond 
spreads, indicating default risk is actually 
increasing 
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Table 2 
Prior Literature and Results Regarding Equity and Credit Effects of Corporate Events 
 (1)  Equity 
Effect 
(2)  Equity Supporting Literature (3) Credit 
Effect 
(4) Credit Supporting Literature 
A
cq
ui
sit
io
ns
 
Zero 
(Economically 
Negative but 
Statistically 
Insignificant) 
Recent studies such as Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2004, 2005) document large acquirer 
stockholder wealth destruction particularly in 
deals involving large acquirers. For acquiring 
firms with CDS markets, this trend continues 
from 2002 through 2014 as equity returns are 
statistically insignificant (-0.376%), but result in 
large economic losses to shareholders.  Deals 
involving large, overleveraged acquirers (Uysal 
(2011)) of public targets (Chang (1988)) are also 
associated with lower equity returns. 
Negative 
Wealth Destruction 
(Weak Support) 
Billett, King, and Mauer (2004) find negative bond returns in the 1980s but not in 
the 1990s; a change attributed by the authors to the prevalence of event restriction 
covenants (ERCs).  I find little evidence that merger restriction covenants 
influence bond returns or changes in CDS spreads.  Bond returns in my study are 
negative and highly significant. While median excess CDS spread increases for 
acquirers are statistically significant (0.75 bps, 5% level), but economically small 
relative to changes in the CDS-bond basis (0.6 bps). 
Positive 
Wealth Transfer 
(Not Supported) 
Default risk reduction due to acquisitions resulting in greater asset diversification 
(Amihud and Lev (1981)) and other factors can contribute to positive credit 
returns.  The relationship between bond/CDS and equity CARs is generally 
positive, thus I find no evidence of a wealth transfer effect from acquiring 
shareholders to bondholders. 
C
om
m
on
 E
qu
ity
 
R
ep
ur
ch
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es
 
Positive 
Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) both find 
common stock repurchases increase a firm's 
equity value around repurchase announcements, 
a result attributed primarily to positive 
information signaling.  A large repurchase is, 
effectively, an intentional leverage increase. In 
the Jensen (1986) context, reduced agency costs 
of free cash flow delivers value to shareholders.  
Consistent with prior theory and empirical 
evidence, from 2002-2014, repurchasing firms 
with CDS markets experience a highly significant 
excess equity return of 0.945%.   
Negative 
Leveraging Effect 
(Counterbalancing) 
All else equal, greater leverage and less available cash will increase default risk.  
This is expressed in wealth redistribution from bondholders to stockholders noted 
by Maxwell and Stephens (2003).  While bonds show significantly negative returns 
(-0.385%) around repurchases, CDSs exhibit no change and therefore do not 
support a leveraging effect.  I also find that bond market liquidity (credit rating 
age and bid-ask spreads) significantly influences repurchasing firm bond returns. 
Positive 
Signaling Effect 
(Counterbalancing) 
Positive information signaling can be expressed in both common stock and debt 
returns, though Dann (1981) finds common equity holders are the primary 
beneficiaries of repurchases.  While multivariate analysis of bond returns and CDS 
spread changes show coefficients on equity CARs have signs consistent with a 
signaling effect, the results are generally insignificant. 
Se
as
on
ed
 E
qu
ity
 
O
ffe
rin
gs
 (S
EO
s)
 
Negative 
Early empirical work finds large negative equity 
returns associated with seasoned equity offerings 
(Masulis and Korwar (1986)), confirming 
predictions of the information asymmetry driven 
pecking-order model presented by Myers and 
Majluf (1984).  Not surprisingly, I find SEO 
issuing firms with CDS markets experience a 
mean return of -2.313%.  The presence of limited 
debt negative bond covenants, restricting 
financing options for SEO issuers, has little 
impact on SEO event window equity returns.   
Negative 
Signaling Effect 
(Weak Support) 
Kalay and Shimrat (1987) find that negative SEO equity returns are driven by the 
release of negative information.  Supporting Elliot, Prevost, and Rao (2009), high 
yield issuer creditors in my study benefit more from SEOs.  Bond returns for SEO 
issuing firms with CDS markets over my sample period are not different from zero.  
Higher SEO equity CARs are significantly associated with higher bond returns and 
lower CDS spreads, though these results are limited by small sample sizes. 
Positive 
Deleveraging Effect 
(Strong Support) 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) find that near-term cash need is a primary 
motive for SEOs and the resulting cash infusion can lower default risk.  In contrast 
to Elliot, Prevost, and Rao (2009), bond returns with CDS tickers are not 
significantly different from zero, CDS spreads, however, decline (-16.6 bps), 
consistent with the deleveraging effect found in prior bond SEO event studies. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Events: Acquisitions 
All acquisitions (Panels A), repurchases (Panel B), and SEOs (Panel C) include transactions announced during the period 2002 to 2014 that are listed on the SDC Platinum.  Primary sample events include firms 
(acquiring firms in the case of acquisitions) with CDS tickers available from Bloomberg at some point during the sample period.  CDS-bond subsample transactions have both CDS and bond pricing data available 
during the event window.  Firm aggregated bond variables are price-weighted by issue.  All events are $1M USD or more in value and represent at least 0.5% of firm market capitalization.  Total assets and market 
capitalization are displayed in 2014 USD.  Variable definitions are provided in the appendix. 
 
 
 
 
N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev
Total Assets 411 101,834.97 24,415.52 279,826.51 1,342 46,465.51 8,349.07 169,695.36 10,729 10,214.10 995.15 77,725.28 1,692 3,759.98 467.81 27,658.50
Market Cap 424 39,348.82 18,338.26 52,029.21 1,423 21,354.77 7,915.94 42,110.40 10,406 5,519.84 926.75 20,587.85 1,581 1,849.03 311.72 5,781.25
Leverage 397 0.281 0.22 0.20 1,155 0.267 0.21 0.20 8,793 0.220 0.17 0.21 1,443 0.258 0.18 0.26
Leverage (Excess) 392 0.022 0.01 0.10 1,141 0.011 0.00 0.10 8,173 0.011 0.00 0.12 1,442 -0.017 -0.03 0.14
Implied Volatility 422 0.094 0.08 0.09 1,317 0.112 0.09 0.10 6,592 0.201 0.17 0.16 741 0.276 0.24 0.19
Tangibility 395 0.386 0.33 0.23 1,164 0.390 0.35 0.24 9,532 0.394 0.35 0.27 1,643 0.390 0.36 0.28
Dividend Yield 407 0.006 0.00 0.01 1,318 0.005 0.00 0.01 10,020 0.003 0.00 0.01 1,375 0.002 0.00 0.01
Operating Cash Flow Yield 407 0.074 0.05 0.20 1,316 0.071 0.05 0.14 9,866 0.046 0.04 0.19 1,303 0.007 0.00 0.21
S&P Rating 406 27.530 27.00 2.76 1,269 26.586 26.00 2.91 3,654 24.591 25.00 3.22 355 23.144 23.00 3.28
InvGrade Rating 406 0.902 1.00 0.30 1,269 0.810 1.00 0.39 3,654 0.521 1.00 0.50 355 0.341 0.00 0.47
S&P Rating Age 406 14.532 15.00 8.62 1,269 16.367 14.00 68.44 3,654 27.885 14.00 183.67 355 21.163 15.00 76.89
E-Index 392 2.459 2.00 1.41 1,266 2.492 2.00 1.35 4,984 2.464 2.00 1.30 349 2.413 2.00 1.22
Market/Book Ratio 409 3.029 2.23 3.18 1,332 2.908 2.20 3.08 10,048 2.649 1.95 2.90 1,528 2.341 1.81 2.64
CEO Options Compensation 397 0.263 0.21 0.25 1,206 0.296 0.22 0.28 5,061 0.264 0.17 0.29 476 0.294 0.19 0.30
CEO Overconfidence 325 0.015 0.00 0.12 972 0.012 0.00 0.11 3,835 0.019 0.00 0.13 345 0.032 0.00 0.18
Product Market Fluidity 395 8.112 7.31 4.47 1,276 7.595 7.09 3.88 9,531 7.760 7.18 3.69 684 8.602 7.82 4.42
Deal Withdrawn 428 0.028 0.00 0.17 1,481 0.034 0.00 0.18 13,855 0.038 0.00 0.19 2,126 0.123 0.00 0.33
Relative Deal Size 425 0.132 0.03 0.30 1,461 0.150 0.04 0.36 12,333 0.303 0.08 0.75 1,962 0.416 0.19 0.65
Cash Payment Percent 428 0.552 0.74 0.46 1,481 0.534 0.66 0.46 13,855 0.474 0.44 0.45 2,126 0.487 0.45 0.43
Private Target 428 0.629 1.00 0.48 1,481 0.727 1.00 0.45 13,855 0.845 1.00 0.36 2,126 0.000 0.00 0.00
Equity CAR [-1,+1] 425 -0.001 0.00 0.04 1,456 0.002 0.00 0.05 11,002 0.010 0.00 0.10 1,534 0.245 0.20 0.28
Panel A: Acquistions
(1)  CDS-Bond Subsample (2) Primary Sample (3)  All Deals (2002-2014) (4)  Public Targets of All Deals (2002-2014)
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Events: Acquisitions 
 
 
N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev
CDS Spread (bps) 425 105.880 62.39 125.22 668 151.655 70.64 538.50 668 151.655 70.64 538.50 56 193.235 103.15 222.32
CDS Bid-Ask Spread (bps) 424 7.581 5.49 5.85 659 10.883 6.33 35.71 659 10.883 6.33 35.71 55 12.790 7.50 18.08
CDS-Bond Basis (bps) 300 -25.744 -13.10 68.50 389 -25.192 -11.83 66.28 420 -27.070 -12.71 69.57 41 -43.830 -23.32 95.03
Number of Bond Issues 428 12.044 8.00 15.24 1,278 7.563 4.00 11.65 4,050 4.432 2.00 8.98 396 3.528 2.00 6.91
Z-Spread (bps) 253 71.698 25.23 132.76 388 84.139 29.91 142.49 551 153.478 47.92 230.83 62 274.309 136.66 729.34
Yield to Maturity (%) 428 4.723 4.76 1.70 875 5.028 5.08 1.91 1,282 5.633 5.34 3.89 117 7.401 6.29 6.14
Coupon (%) 428 6.090 6.08 1.27 879 6.174 6.10 1.45 1,292 6.454 6.42 1.59 118 6.908 6.78 1.67
Premium/Discount 428 0.074 0.07 0.07 875 0.058 0.05 0.08 1,282 0.048 0.04 0.08 118 0.025 0.04 0.11
Bond Age (Years) 423 4.164 3.74 2.62 845 3.749 3.29 2.81 1,186 3.357 2.78 2.75 103 3.426 2.87 2.54
Bond Maturity 428 8.606 7.68 4.87 879 8.037 7.06 4.85 1,292 7.650 6.98 4.43 119 8.268 6.46 5.97
Bond Duration 427 5.535 5.42 3.32 877 5.230 4.90 3.46 1,283 5.227 4.66 11.23 118 4.205 4.13 10.58
Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread 428 0.002 0.00 0.00 878 0.003 0.00 0.00 1,284 0.003 0.00 0.00 118 0.004 0.00 0.00
Bond Trade Volume 300 1,453.61 495.67 2,543.37 497 1,450.69 481.71 2,570.43 651 1,463.48 486.18 2,651.84 54 1,093.86 527.17 1,616.83
Callable Bonds Ratio 428 0.344 0.24 0.35 879 0.438 0.35 0.42 1,292 0.539 0.53 0.44 119 0.555 0.58 0.43
Putable Bonds Ratio 428 0.007 0.00 0.03 879 0.013 0.00 0.08 1,292 0.009 0.00 0.06 119 0.009 0.00 0.09
Secured Bonds Ratio 424 0.010 0.00 0.09 859 0.014 0.00 0.11 1,258 0.026 0.00 0.15 111 0.032 0.00 0.17
Senior Bonds Ratio 428 0.930 1.00 0.19 879 0.892 1.00 0.27 1,292 0.907 1.00 0.25 119 0.899 1.00 0.26
Cov Ratio: Limited Debt 421 0.137 0.00 0.31 813 0.257 0.00 0.40 1,176 0.378 0.00 0.46 103 0.329 0.00 0.46
Cov Ratio: Merger Restrictive 421 0.859 1.00 0.27 813 0.850 1.00 0.29 1,177 0.876 1.00 0.26 103 0.915 1.00 0.22
Cov Ratio: Payout Policy 421 0.072 0.00 0.24 813 0.139 0.00 0.32 1,176 0.283 0.00 0.43 103 0.292 0.00 0.43
Bank Debt 422 0.057 0.00 0.24 1,449 0.098 0.00 0.27 10,352 0.347 0.00 2.62 1,404 0.487 0.00 6.02
Panel A: Acquistions (Continued)
(1)  CDS-Bond Subsample (2) Primary Sample (3)  All Deals (2002-2014) (4)  Public Targets of All Deals (2002-2014)
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Events: Common Equity Repurchases 
  
N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev
Total Assets 576 102,448.93 23,781.34 271,760.50 1,273 64,650.62 12,572.29 199,687.07 7,108 18,178.34 1,383.41 107,303.11
Market Cap 593 41,912.88 17,544.96 63,742.98 1,321 29,570.89 11,736.92 54,226.03 7,143 9,011.16 1,224.85 29,789.22
Leverage 554 0.265 0.21 0.20 1,205 0.247 0.19 0.19 6,443 0.216 0.15 0.22
Leverage (Excess) 549 0.012 0.00 0.09 1,195 0.008 0.00 0.09 6,072 0.010 0.00 0.11
Implied Volatility 591 0.089 0.08 0.08 1,301 0.102 0.09 0.09 4,852 0.175 0.15 0.14
Tangibility 553 0.365 0.31 0.22 1,207 0.357 0.33 0.21 6,871 0.351 0.32 0.25
Dividend Yield 573 0.008 0.00 0.01 1,260 0.006 0.00 0.01 6,688 0.003 0.00 0.01
Operating Cash Flow Yield 573 0.075 0.07 0.17 1,259 0.074 0.06 0.15 6,643 0.062 0.05 0.26
S&P Rating 572 27.357 27.00 2.44 1,234 26.950 27.00 2.72 2,705 25.717 26.00 3.02
InvGrade Rating 572 0.895 1.00 0.31 1,234 0.835 1.00 0.37 2,705 0.660 1.00 0.47
S&P Rating Age 572 15.490 16.00 8.67 1,234 15.154 16.00 8.78 2,705 18.773 15.00 76.12
E-Index 571 2.161 2.00 1.46 1,243 2.292 2.00 1.46 4,101 2.413 2.00 1.36
Market/Book Ratio 576 3.226 2.32 3.37 1,272 3.207 2.38 3.15 6,869 2.677 1.89 2.86
CEO Options Compensation 580 0.248 0.20 0.22 1,261 0.284 0.22 0.26 4,292 0.259 0.19 0.27
CEO Overconfidence 481 0.004 0.00 0.06 1,042 0.007 0.00 0.08 3,348 0.018 0.00 0.13
Product Market Fluidity 554 6.664 5.60 4.01 1,226 6.759 5.87 3.86 6,621 7.380 6.57 3.95
Open Market Repurchase 595 0.960 1.00 0.20 1,342 0.943 1.00 0.23 8,066 0.941 1.00 0.24
Repurchase Withdrawn 595 0.017 0.00 0.13 1,342 0.019 0.00 0.14 8,066 0.018 0.00 0.13
Additional Borrowing 595 0.015 0.00 0.12 1,342 0.017 0.00 0.13 8,066 0.013 0.00 0.11
Repurchase Size 595 0.088 0.07 0.08 1,342 0.087 0.07 0.08 8,066 0.091 0.06 0.10
Equity CAR [-1,+1] 593 0.011 0.01 0.04 1,334 0.011 0.01 0.05 7,415 0.015 0.01 0.08
CDS Spread (bps) 592 85.249 55.58 153.65 811 162.791 60.16 706.32 811 162.791 60.16 706.32
CDS Bid-Ask Spread (bps) 592 6.749 5.15 6.45 807 11.306 5.42 43.35 807 11.306 5.42 43.35
CDS-Bond Basis (bps) 410 -21.689 -9.93 62.72 502 -20.519 -9.93 59.32 527 -22.567 -10.05 62.40
Number of Bond Issues 595 11.136 8.00 12.32 1,190 8.050 5.00 10.62 2,813 5.285 3.00 9.41
Z-Spread (bps) 348 49.262 16.99 127.58 500 65.252 20.85 139.49 606 101.597 29.71 189.89
Yield to Maturity (%) 595 4.586 4.66 1.84 957 4.743 4.77 1.94 1,204 5.045 4.93 2.70
Coupon (%) 595 6.025 6.05 1.20 958 5.984 6.04 1.26 1,208 6.059 6.13 1.42
Premium/Discount 595 0.071 0.07 0.08 957 0.062 0.06 0.07 1,205 0.054 0.05 0.08
Bond Age (Years) 579 4.331 3.95 2.80 905 4.074 3.63 2.79 1,131 3.800 3.27 2.81
Bond Maturity 595 9.793 8.50 6.20 958 9.235 7.83 5.83 1,209 8.927 7.45 5.82
Bond Duration 595 6.301 5.99 3.21 958 6.097 5.71 4.41 1,208 5.830 5.53 4.17
Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread 593 0.002 0.00 0.00 955 0.002 0.00 0.00 1,203 0.002 0.00 0.00
Bond Trade Volume 428 1,537.78 552.62 3,412.86 649 1,458.54 512.79 3,186.85 780 1,423.79 488.61 3,080.45
Callable Bonds Ratio 595 0.327 0.24 0.34 958 0.370 0.27 0.38 1,209 0.415 0.32 0.41
Putable Bonds Ratio 595 0.008 0.00 0.03 958 0.011 0.00 0.08 1,209 0.009 0.00 0.07
Secured Bonds Ratio 588 0.007 0.00 0.07 944 0.010 0.00 0.09 1,192 0.012 0.00 0.10
Senior Bonds Ratio 595 0.915 1.00 0.20 958 0.893 1.00 0.24 1,209 0.899 1.00 0.24
Cov Ratio: Limited Debt 573 0.104 0.00 0.24 909 0.128 0.00 0.28 1,146 0.189 0.00 0.35
Cov Ratio: Merger Restrictive 573 0.858 1.00 0.25 910 0.870 1.00 0.25 1,147 0.890 1.00 0.24
Cov Ratio: Payout Policy 572 0.055 0.00 0.20 908 0.089 0.00 0.26 1,145 0.157 0.00 0.34
Bank Debt 591 0.048 0.00 0.17 1,302 0.084 0.00 0.20 6,261 0.493 0.00 12.57
(1)  CDS-Bond Subsample (2) Primary Sample (3)  All Deals (2002-2014)
Panel B: Common Stock Repurchases
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Events: Seasoned Equity Offerings 
 
N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev N Mean Median Stdev
Total Assets 100 178,472.84 22,173.62 436,155.41 490 47,299.77 7,467.13 208,901.71 5,757 7,952.96 859.35 75,982.89
Market Cap 105 22,688.81 10,915.54 46,353.35 512 9,683.37 3,792.47 23,135.11 5,516 2,472.47 787.32 8,652.28
Leverage 98 0.469 0.44 0.22 400 0.437 0.41 0.20 4,547 0.289 0.26 0.26
Leverage (Excess) 98 0.010 0.01 0.10 398 0.004 0.00 0.10 4,057 -0.031 -0.04 0.13
Implied Volatility 104 0.205 0.14 0.24 443 0.186 0.12 0.22 3,361 0.268 0.21 0.25
Tangibility 88 0.467 0.46 0.26 380 0.526 0.58 0.25 5,002 0.480 0.48 0.32
Dividend Yield 100 0.004 0.00 0.01 489 0.005 0.00 0.02 5,492 0.002 0.00 0.01
Operating Cash Flow Yield 100 0.032 0.06 0.29 489 0.061 0.05 0.17 5,284 0.016 0.03 0.30
S&P Rating 100 25.670 26.00 3.52 468 25.124 26.00 3.00 1,828 23.437 23.00 2.90
InvGrade Rating 100 0.790 1.00 0.41 468 0.705 1.00 0.46 1,828 0.411 0.00 0.49
S&P Rating Age 100 13.650 13.50 8.58 468 13.395 12.00 8.67 1,828 24.728 12.00 135.57
E-Index 78 2.628 3.00 1.39 335 2.606 3.00 1.29 1,368 2.510 3.00 1.27
Market/Book Ratio 100 2.531 1.63 4.97 490 2.239 1.79 3.94 5,310 3.399 1.95 7.81
CEO Options Compensation 83 0.216 0.13 0.26 343 0.215 0.13 0.25 1,547 0.192 0.06 0.26
CEO Overconfidence 53 0.038 0.00 0.19 225 0.022 0.00 0.15 986 0.024 0.00 0.15
Product Market Fluidity 96 10.173 9.10 5.67 475 8.673 7.98 4.81 4,774 9.267 8.23 4.72
SEO Size 105 0.094 0.07 0.10 525 0.095 0.07 0.09 6,551 0.201 0.13 0.26
Equity CAR [-1,+1] 105 -0.029 -0.02 0.07 521 -0.022 -0.02 0.06 5,286 -0.031 -0.03 0.10
CDS Spread (bps) 105 299.654 160.89 385.61 199 294.007 147.58 414.63 199 294.007 147.58 414.63
CDS Bid-Ask Spread 105 16.531 10.00 23.91 194 17.379 10.00 22.3 194 17.379 10.00 22.3
CDS-Bond Basis (bps) 70 -40.050 -18.92 121.80 107 -41.446 -23.59 104.18 116 -44.540 -23.56 109.13
Number of Bond Issues 105 16.362 10.00 24.93 411 8.005 4.00 14.65 1,750 4.019 2.00 8.81
Z-Spread (bps) 54 208.793 91.35 326.18 103 255.073 124.72 376.18 185 365.390 215.32 483.27
Yield to Maturity (%) 104 6.616 5.64 3.29 257 6.664 5.92 3.48 440 7.732 6.40 6.66
Coupon (%) 105 6.428 6.38 1.35 264 6.604 6.48 1.43 449 7.044 6.88 1.69
Premium/Discount 104 0.004 0.02 0.14 257 0.003 0.03 0.13 440 0.005 0.02 0.13
Bond Age (Years) 105 3.914 2.98 3.35 257 3.084 2.57 2.68 412 2.773 2.38 2.42
Bond Maturity 105 10.415 8.12 7.47 264 8.544 7.29 5.74 449 7.793 7.00 4.77
Bond Duration 105 6.427 5.48 9.13 264 5.540 4.82 6.25 448 5.129 4.50 6.69
Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread 103 0.002 0.00 0.00 258 0.011 0.00 0.12 441 0.008 0.00 0.10
Bond Trade Volume 75 1,571.59 695.78 2,167.11 129 1,449.58 614.65 1,999.51 196 1,468.02 612.33 2,133.17
Callable Bonds Ratio 105 0.394 0.34 0.37 264 0.526 0.53 0.43 449 0.641 1.00 0.42
Putable Bonds Ratio 105 0.017 0.00 0.06 264 0.008 0.00 0.04 449 0.005 0.00 0.03
Secured Bonds Ratio 105 0.026 0.00 0.13 254 0.040 0.00 0.17 435 0.050 0.00 0.20
Senior Bonds Ratio 105 0.890 1.00 0.24 264 0.903 1.00 0.25 449 0.921 1.00 0.24
Cov Ratio: Limited Debt 100 0.149 0.00 0.30 240 0.322 0.00 0.44 403 0.514 0.63 0.47
Cov Ratio: Merger Restrictive 100 0.867 1.00 0.24 240 0.871 1.00 0.26 403 0.905 1.00 0.22
Cov Ratio: Payout Policy 100 0.105 0.00 0.26 240 0.207 0.00 0.38 403 0.394 0.00 0.47
Bank Debt 105 0.080 0.00 0.16 525 0.113 0.00 0.22 5,417 0.478 0.00 3.42
Panel C: Seasoned Equity Offerings
(1)  CDS-Bond Subsample (2) Primary Sample (3)  All Deals (2002-2014)
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Security Returns around Corporate Events: Acquisitions 
Excess returns are formed on the window [-5,+1] and are displayed in percent.    Equity returns are in excess of their expected four factor (including momentum) Fama-French value-weighted market index model 
returns.  Bond excess returns are firm-aggregated price-weighted excess returns.  Individual bonds are maturity benchmarked against short, intermediate, and long Barclays corporate investment grade and high yield 
indices.  A firm is designated investment grade if the firm's S&P Rating is BBB- and higher and high yield if below BB- or unrated.  Unless specified, cross-sections are constructed using all relevant transactions 
(and only acquirer characteristics in Panel A).  Financials (Utilities) include firms with 6000 (4900) SIC codes.  The significance level of the median is determined using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  The signficance 
level of the difference in medians is determined using a Wilcoxon rank-sum  (Mann-Whitney) test.   The symbols ****, ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.   †††,††, and † denote significant differences in cross-sectional non-parametric tests at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
All Deals -0.127 ** -0.304 **** 1,225 1.909 *** 0.911 **** 120 0.946 **** 0.245 **** 11,002 25.573 **** 21.249 **** 1,552
Primary Sample -0.171 ** -0.313 **** 845 3.179 ** 0.940 **** 58 † 0.072 -0.092 1,456 ††† 25.942 **** 22.133 **** 365
CDS-Bond Sample -0.300 *** -0.394 **** 428 †† 4.372 ** 1.459 **** 32 †† -0.376 -0.370 425 †† 29.901 **** 25.931 **** 148 ††
2002-2006 0.043 -0.197 ** 544 ††† 0.913 ** 0.633 ** 49 0.654 **** 0.328 *** 5,189 ††† 21.809 **** 17.367 **** 750 ††††
2007-2009 -0.156 -0.331 *** 277 5.115 * 0.990 ** 29 0.885 **** 0.183 ** 2,167 28.278 **** 23.976 **** 371 ††
2010-2014 -0.336 **** -0.386 **** 404 †† 0.858 ** 0.930 ** 42 1.397 **** 0.403 **** 3,646 ††† 29.793 **** 25.835 **** 431 ††††
Investment Grade -0.094 -0.306 **** 706 3.450 *** 1.204 **** 61 ††† -0.022 -0.113 1,869 26.306 **** 22.436 **** 456
High Yield -0.171 * -0.295 *** 519 0.316 0.136 59 1.144 **** 0.345 **** 9,133 †††† 25.268 **** 20.632 **** 1,096
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old 0.135 -0.068 537 3.325 ** 1.200 **** 48 †† 0.202 0.000 1,840 25.927 **** 22.432 **** 326
S&P Rating More Than Two Weeks Old -0.307 **** -0.426 **** 653 †††† 0.971 * 0.533 * 69 1.110 **** 0.292 **** 9,018 †† 25.492 **** 20.783 **** 1,196
Below Median Bond Relative Spread -0.038 -0.267 *** 582 4.301 ** 1.897 *** 28 ††† 0.089 -0.420 631 29.643 **** 24.440 **** 165 ††
Above Median Bond Relative Spread -0.213 *** -0.314 **** 636 1.993 *** 0.997 *** 28 0.662 ** 0.427 *** 621 †† 23.907 **** 21.595 **** 132
Below Median Bond Trade Volume -0.065 -0.251 302 2.658 *** 1.640 *** 21 0.082 -0.252 318 26.206 **** 22.097 **** 90
Above Median Bond Trade Volume -0.390 **** -0.399 **** 286 † 6.213 2.619 *** 17 0.436 0.031 322 33.534 **** 29.257 **** 33 †
Industrial Firms -0.173 ** -0.301 **** 874 1.423 *** 0.990 **** 77 1.232 **** 0.461 **** 7,584 †††† 27.828 **** 23.441 **** 1,009 ††††
Financials and Utilities -0.013 -0.307 ** 351 2.779 0.443 43 0.310 *** -0.079 3,418 21.382 **** 17.303 **** 543
Cash Payment Only -0.089 -0.276 *** 513 0.783 * 0.831 * 23 0.721 **** 0.209 **** 3,955 33.395 **** 28.559 **** 575 ††††
Stock Payment Only -0.067 -0.204 * 459 † 3.462 * 1.121 *** 36 1.127 **** 0.262 **** 3,917 18.118 **** 14.132 **** 455 ††††
Private Targets -0.084 -0.290 **** 913 0.111 -0.181 6 1.281 **** 0.425 **** 9,093 †††† N/A N/A N/A
Public Targets -0.253 ** -0.325 *** 312 2.004 *** 0.927 **** 114 -0.650 *** -0.718 **** 1,909 25.573 21.249 1,552
(4) Target Equity Excess Return
Panel A: Acquisitions
(2) Target Bonds Excess Return(1) Acquirer Bonds Excess Return (3) Acquirer Equity Excess Return
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics of Security Returns around Corporate Events: Repurchases/SEOs 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N
All Repurchases -0.208 *** -0.357 **** 1,131 0.856 **** 0.852 **** 7,415
Primary Sample -0.256 **** -0.385 **** 904 † 0.896 **** 0.882 **** 1,334
CDS-Bond Subsample -0.281 **** -0.403 **** 595 0.945 **** 0.924 **** 593
2002-2006 -0.126 -0.280 **** 361 0.654 *** 0.734 **** 2,445 †
2007-2009 -0.151 -0.275 *** 287 1.360 **** 1.179 **** 2,157 †††
2010-2014 -0.303 **** -0.433 **** 483 0.644 **** 0.793 **** 2,813
Investment Grade -0.218 *** -0.384 **** 821 0.661 **** 0.839 **** 1,775
High Yield -0.181 -0.244 *** 310 0.917 **** 0.857 **** 5,640
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old 0.153 0.004 464 0.516 *** 0.831 **** 1,268
S&P Rating More Than Two Weeks Old -0.442 **** -0.549 **** 628 †††† 0.918 **** 0.874 **** 6,064
Below Median Bond Relative Spread -0.287 *** -0.465 **** 531 ††† 0.805 *** 0.783 **** 593
Above Median Bond Relative Spread -0.140 * -0.263 **** 595 0.980 *** 0.945 **** 597
Below Median Bond Trade Volume -0.204 * -0.467 **** 356 0.760 *** 0.749 *** 387
Above Median Bond Trade Volume -0.369 **** -0.432 **** 356 0.859 *** 0.924 **** 384
Industrial Firms -0.262 *** -0.364 **** 866 0.934 **** 0.955 **** 5,468 †
Financials and Utilities -0.031 -0.294 *** 265 0.636 **** 0.651 **** 1,947
Mean Median N Mean Median N
All SEOs 0.594 *** 0.090 * 436 -2.189 **** -2.519 **** 5,286
Primary Sample 0.238 -0.049 257 -1.837 **** -1.838 **** 521 †††
CDS-Bond Subsample 0.257 -0.093 105 -2.313 ** -2.091 *** 105
2002-2006 0.451 ** 0.113 182 -2.407 **** -2.251 **** 1,771 ††
2007-2009 0.979 * 0.189 118 -3.354 **** -3.320 **** 1,022 †††
2010-2014 0.452 -0.092 136 -1.557 **** -2.558 **** 2,493
Investment Grade 0.348 0.051 197 -2.085 **** -2.049 **** 747
High Yield 0.796 *** 0.185 * 239 -2.206 **** -2.649 **** 4,539 †††
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old 0.810 *** 0.348 *** 211 ††† -2.498 **** -2.470 **** 1,005
S&P Rating More Than Two Weeks Old 0.419 -0.095 213 -2.111 **** -2.551 **** 4,239
Below Median Bond Relative Spread 0.577 ** -0.064 210 -1.474 ** -1.621 *** 217
Above Median Bond Relative Spread 0.556 ** 0.193 * 218 -2.094 *** -1.816 **** 220
Below Median Bond Trade Volume 0.296 0.207 95 -1.425 -1.292 *** 98
Above Median Bond Trade Volume 0.272 -0.194 90 -2.279 *** -2.059 *** 96
Industrial Firms 0.304 * 0.007 268 -1.932 **** -2.811 **** 3,291 ††
Financials and Utilities 1.056 *** 0.199 * 168 -2.614 **** -2.239 **** 1,995
Panel C: SEOs
Panel B: Repurchases
(1) Bonds Excess Return (2) Equity Excess Return
(1) Bonds Excess Return (2) Equity Excess Return
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Table 5 
Regressions Explaining Acquirer and Target Firm Aggregated Bond Returns 
The dependent variables in OLS regression specifications in Panel A are cash bond excess returns calculated as firm-aggregated price-weighted excess 
returns on the window [-5,+1] around the deal announcement date.  Individual bonds are matched by short, intermediate, and long maturity sub-indices of 
the Barclays investment grade and high yield indices respectively.  Deals include all mergers and acquisitions announced during the period 2002 to 2014 
that are listed on the SDC Platinum M&A database and have acquirer and target bond data from Bloomberg available during the event window.  Targets 
must be $1M or larger and represent 0.5% of acquirer market value. Additional controls include Tangibility, Bank Debt, Operating Cash Flow Yield, E-
Index, CEO Options Compensation, CEO Overconfidence, and Product Market Fluidity.  Standard errors clustered on deal year are reported in 
parentheses.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)    (9)
Acquirer > Target Rating -0.447 -0.301 -0.571* -0.308 -0.314  1.842  3.211***  4.505***  3.874***
(0.524) (0.249) (0.283) (0.369) (0.304) (2.087) (0.979) (1.204) (1.144)
Equity Implied Volatility  0.427  0.006  0.142  0.042 -0.022  4.138  2.729  2.735  3.390
    Combined > Acquirer (or Target) (0.404) (0.428) (0.571) (0.518) (0.488) (3.574) (2.126) (2.461) (2.469)
Market Leverage -0.219  2.173
     Combined > Acquirer (or Target) (0.258) (2.759)
Acquirer Excess Leverage  1.589  2.842*  1.817  2.213 -1.478  3.962  4.952
(1.050) (1.349) (1.377) (1.373) (4.372) (6.389) (7.338)
Target Excess Leverage -1.944 -1.947 -1.528 -1.349  20.420*  18.030  20.540
(1.178) (1.541) (1.279) (1.294) (11.080) (16.800) (15.370)
Acquirer > Target Maturity  0.348 -4.773
(0.368) (3.162)
Acquirer (or Target) Maturity -0.038 -0.025 -0.025 -0.031  0.048  0.141  0.066
(0.034) (0.050) (0.040) (0.043) (0.104) (0.148) (0.091)
Relative Size of Target/Acquirer -0.599 -1.007* -0.992* -1.024 -1.080 -4.448 -2.350 -3.962 -4.324*
(0.453) (0.533) (0.524) (0.667) (0.614) (3.870) (1.743) (2.356) (2.322)
Cash Percentage of Payment -1.182** -0.807 -0.780 -0.890 -0.919 -6.555 -0.630 -2.234 -1.991
(0.525) (0.464) (0.641) (0.649) (0.575) (4.945) (1.595) (2.209) (2.179)
Financial Crisis (2007-2009) -0.476 -0.362 -0.383 -0.448 -0.354  7.459  3.380  3.674*  2.579
(0.577) (0.471) (0.467) (0.567) (0.525) (4.913) (2.002) (1.869) (1.808)
Same Industry Dummy (3 Digit SIC)  0.128 -0.055 -0.131 -0.177 -0.082 -0.924 -0.230 -1.190 -0.629
(0.422) (0.398) (0.410) (0.470) (0.457) (3.031) (1.604) (1.891) (1.925)
Withdrawn Deal -0.491 -0.352 -0.359 -0.372  0.010  1.457 -0.941 -0.920 -1.039
(0.321) (0.364) (0.399) (0.367) (0.518) (2.393) (1.857) (2.718) (2.701)
Cov Ratio: Merger Restrictive -0.445 -0.211 -0.086 -5.434 -3.619
(0.330) (0.376) (0.398) (3.759) (3.517)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) -0.781*** -0.775
(0.196) (0.851)
Bonds Relative Bid-Ask Spread   14.94 -181.50
(100.50) (296.10)
Target Equity CAR -0.002
(0.006)
Intercept  0.271  0.755  3.049**  0.875  0.883  6.346  1.009  7.801  5.915
(0.746) (0.647) (1.291) (0.861) (0.941) (5.657) (1.107) (5.151) (4.188)
Number of Observations 38 81 71 73 72 38 63 51 53
Adjusted R² -0.050  0.059  0.180  0.010  0.004  0.119  0.089  0.052  0.059
Target BondsAcquirer Bonds
Panel A: Public Targets
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Regressions Explaining Acquirer Firm Aggregated Bond Returns 
 
 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)
S&P Credit Rating  0.099*  0.091  0.103  0.085  0.104  0.126  0.126  0.120
(0.050) (0.051) (0.077) (0.083) (0.077) (0.083) (0.085) (0.082)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) -0.372*** -0.364*** -0.401*** -0.392*** -0.401*** -0.335*** -0.337*** -0.333***
(0.102) (0.104) (0.101) (0.110) (0.101) (0.071) (0.073) (0.071)
Log(Market Cap) -0.180 -0.159 -0.198 -0.153 -0.198 -0.263 -0.263 -0.255
(0.128) (0.129) (0.151) (0.187) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152) (0.148)
Excess Leverage  0.426  0.205 -0.056  1.247 -0.055 -0.229 -0.224 -0.103
(0.661) (0.872) (0.723) (0.985) (0.724) (0.780) (0.776) (0.822)
Market/Book Ratio  0.013  0.012  0.001  0.050  0.001 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023
(0.042) (0.043) (0.047) (0.043) (0.047) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Implied Volatility  0.716  0.831  1.014  3.793*  1.016  0.860  0.836  0.629
(0.991) (0.973) (1.000) (1.770) (0.994) (1.103) (1.119) (1.111)
Bond Maturity  0.005  0.005 -0.007  0.001 -0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006
(0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030)
Relative Size (Target/Acquirer) -0.354 -0.321 -0.244  0.132 -0.252 -0.223 -0.225 -0.231
(0.253) (0.249) (0.267) (0.283) (0.258) (0.219) (0.220) (0.208)
Cash Percentage of Payment -0.008  0.051  0.038  0.062  0.009 -0.006 -0.008 -0.059
(0.159) (0.168) (0.144) (0.209) (0.171) (0.217) (0.222) (0.240)
Same Industry Dummy (3 Digit SIC) -0.227* -0.220 -0.214 -0.287 -0.214 -0.298 -0.295 -0.291
(0.122) (0.124) (0.151) (0.191) (0.151) (0.172) (0.175) (0.180)
Withdrawn Deal -0.317 -0.431 -0.391 -0.845 -0.388 -0.473 -0.457 -0.407
(0.282) (0.343) (0.366) (0.600) (0.368) (0.410) (0.403) (0.431)
Private Target  0.007  0.042  0.091  0.296  0.030 -0.110 -0.111 -0.197
(0.176) (0.172) (0.149) (0.186) (0.290) (0.326) (0.324) (0.342)
Private Target × Cash Percentage  0.185  0.679  0.675  0.875
(0.868) (0.944) (0.950) (1.004)
Cov Ratio: Merger Restrictive -0.179 -0.202 -0.225
(0.319) (0.326) (0.323)
Bonds Relative Bid-Ask Spread   1.853  -0.182
(28.910) (28.670)
Acquirer Equity CAR  0.018*
(0.009)
Intercept -0.309 -0.865  6.531*** -1.043  6.567*** -0.904 -0.883 -0.498
(0.701) (0.659) (1.327) (1.856) (1.310) (1.142) (1.184) (1.042)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (2 Digit SIC) Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No Yes No No No No
Number of Observations 817 817 817 538 817 759 755 753
Adjusted R²  0.032  0.041  0.096  0.105  0.095  0.110  0.107  0.108
Acquirer Bonds
Panel B: All Targets
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Table 6 
Regressions Explaining Individual Bond Returns around Acquisitions 
The dependent variables in OLS regression specifications are individual cash bond excess returns calculated as firm-aggregated price-weighted excess 
returns on the window [-5,+1] around the deal announcement date.  Individual bonds are matched by short, intermediate, and long maturity sub-indices of 
the Barclays investment grade and high yield indices respectively.  Coefficients for Cash Percentage of Payment and Private Target are not shown.  
Additional time variant firm controls include Market Capitalization, Excess Leverage, M/B Ratio, Implied Volatility, Tangibility, Bank Debt, Operating 
Cash Flow Yield, E-Index, CEO Options Compensation, CEO Overconfidence, and Product Market Fluidity.  Standard errors clustered on deal year are 
reported in parentheses.  The symbols ****, ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)
S&P Credit Rating  0.024  0.046  0.199** -0.006  0.160  0.450 -0.363 -0.141
(0.031) (0.037) (0.083) (0.076) (0.133) (0.364) (0.744) (0.534)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) -0.345*** -0.379**** -0.522**** -0.419**** -0.571**** -1.136** -1.179*** -0.686
(0.075) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.078) (0.425) (0.291) (0.678)
Acquirer > Target Bond Rating 2.568*  1.838 -1.033
(1.376) (2.278) (4.014)
Bond Maturity -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 -0.013 -0.032  0.042  0.074
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.123) (0.166) (0.194)
Cov: Merger Restrictive  0.144  0.214  0.114  0.190  0.222  0.383  1.556**  2.126***
(0.150) (0.190) (0.247) (0.191) (0.273) (2.588) (0.584) (0.646)
Cov: Limited Debt  0.166  0.214  0.070  0.365**  0.329  2.476**  1.187 -0.435
(0.196) (0.146) (0.187) (0.166) (0.220) (0.946) (1.734) (2.595)
Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread  25.57** 29.72***  36.90**  37.09***  36.61* -128.00 -329.20* -291.60**
(10.37) (7.67) (15.67) (11.52) (18.38) (105.90) (158.90) (129.90)
Log(Bond Issue Amount) -0.004 -0.090 -0.008  0.105  0.023  0.997  0.986 1.345*
(0.081) (0.125) (0.141) (0.133) (0.167) (0.610) (0.617) (0.658)
Bond Coupon -0.017 -0.025 -0.063** -0.035 -0.076**  0.950*  1.074**  1.025**
(0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) (0.031) (0.447) (0.459) (0.409)
Bond Callable -0.178 -0.161 -0.164 -0.121 -0.209 -0.055  1.164  1.304
(0.119) (0.145) (0.181) (0.128) (0.193) (1.721) (1.463) (1.570)
Bond Putable  0.166  0.098  0.208  0.219  0.319 -4.474 -6.203*** -8.861*
(0.325) (0.345) (0.439) (0.357) (0.386) (3.398) (1.105) (4.439)
Bond Secured -0.150  0.026  0.032 -0.431 -0.530 -1.440 -5.982 -6.261
(0.412) (0.368) (0.834) (0.563) (0.453) (1.584) (3.999) (3.742)
Bond Senior -0.100 -0.145 -0.052 0.423* 0.469** -11.550 -5.623* -6.378**
(0.148) (0.325) (0.468) (0.223) (0.156) (7.295) (2.831) (2.812)
Relative Size (Target/Acquirer) -0.871** -0.728* -0.755* -0.698* -1.034*  0.485
(0.338) (0.379) (0.371) (0.391) (0.479) (3.152)
Same Industry Dummy (3 Digit SIC) -0.107* -0.177*** -0.371** -0.224 -0.543** -6.723
(0.058) (0.052) (0.125) (0.135) (0.210) (6.011)
Withdrawn Deal -0.759*** -0.639** -0.595 -0.463 -0.261 -0.664
(0.248) (0.226) (0.535) (0.448) (0.588) (2.248)
Intercept  0.227  3.449  1.733 -0.942  5.003 -23.110 -15.040 -18.440
(1.689) (2.030) (3.828) (2.681) (7.069) (12.870) (21.780) (16.590)
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes No No No
Industry (2 Digit SIC) Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Firm Controls No No Yes No Yes No No No
Number of Observations 3,229 3,229 2,008 3,229 2,008 196 196 196
Adjusted R²  0.059  0.087  0.136  0.156  0.222  0.100  0.248  0.250
Target BondsAcquirer Bonds
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Table 7 
Regressions Explaining Bond Returns around Common Equity Repurchases 
The dependent variables in Panel A are cash bond excess returns calculated as firm-aggregated price-weighted excess returns on the window [-5,+1] 
around the repurchase announcement date.  Individual bonds are matched by short, intermediate, and long maturity sub-indices of the Barclays 
investment grade and high yield indices respectively.  Unless displayed, additional controls include Market Capitalization, Implied Volatility, Excess 
Leverage, M/B Ratio, Lagged Equity Return, Additional Borrowing, Tangibility, Dividend Yield, Operating Cash Flow Yield, E-Index, Bank Debt, CEO 
Options Compensation, CEO Overconfidence, and Product Market Fluidity.  Repurchases include all announced during the period 2002 to 2014 that are 
listed on the SDC Platinum database.  Repurchases must be $1M or larger in value and represent 0.5% of firm market equity value. Standard errors 
clustered on repurchase year are reported in parentheses.  The symbols ****, ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)
S&P Credit Rating  0.054  0.071  0.022  0.048  0.069  0.018
(0.046) (0.065) (0.082) (0.059) (0.082) (0.099)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) -0.570*** -0.574*** -0.585*** -0.517**** -0.516**** -0.544***
(0.112) (0.101) (0.114) (0.087) (0.077) (0.113)
Log(Market Cap) -0.154** -0.252** -0.202 -0.162** -0.254** -0.191
(0.058) (0.090) (0.156) (0.061) (0.105) (0.170)
Excess Leverage -0.093 -0.210 -0.261 -0.060  0.155 -0.338
(0.761) (0.834) (1.082) (0.709) (0.799) (1.115)
Market/Book Ratio -0.003 -0.016 -0.016 -0.007 -0.020 -0.022
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017)
Lagged Equity Return  0.111  0.102  0.159  0.108  0.084  0.133
(0.119) (0.155) (0.181) (0.119) (0.141) (0.161)
Implied Volatility -2.093** -2.534** -3.271* -2.205*** -2.619** -3.563**
(0.759) (1.071) (1.507) (0.716) (0.920) (1.453)
Bond Maturity  0.028**  0.031***  0.023*  0.029***  0.034***  0.018
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012)
Repurchase Size  0.076  0.240 -0.128  0.117  0.258 -0.168
(0.095) (0.171) (0.284) (0.081) (0.168) (0.277)
Withdrawn Repurchase -0.293 -0.303 -0.247 -0.194 -0.179 -0.180
(0.202) (0.249) (0.352) (0.275) (0.267) (0.390)
Open Market Repurchase  0.369  0.311  0.414  0.408  0.332  0.414
(0.219) (0.270) (0.391) (0.231) (0.285) (0.416)
Bonds Relative Bid-Ask Spread -12.69 -13.09 -51.39
(32.56) (31.39) (45.51)
Cov Ratio: Payout Policy -0.134 -0.155  0.283
(0.187) (0.274) (0.423)
Equity CAR  0.038*  0.036  0.021
(0.020) (0.022) (0.030)
Intercept  1.130  0.189  2.479  1.152  2.045  2.678
(1.186) (1.517) (2.112) (1.564) (2.168) (2.673)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (2 Digit SIC) Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Number of Observations 913 913 667 860 860 635
Adjusted R²  0.064  0.081  0.070  0.065  0.080  0.071
Panel A: Firm Aggregated Bond Returns
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Table 7 (Continued) 
Regressions Explaining Bond Returns around Common Equity Repurchases 
 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)
S&P Credit Rating  0.023  0.026  0.052  0.022  0.022 -0.009
(0.028) (0.037) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) -0.487**** -0.483**** -0.460**** -0.495**** -0.495**** -0.476***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.049) (0.061) (0.061) (0.091)
Bond Maturity  0.009*  0.009*  0.006  0.003  0.003  0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Cov: Payout Policy -0.249 -0.259 -0.104  0.170  0.171 -0.195
(0.170) (0.162) (0.362) (0.356) (0.358) (0.256)
Cov: Limited Debt  0.329**  0.282**  0.222  0.066  0.066 -0.082
(0.116) (0.123) (0.204) (0.095) (0.095) (0.138)
Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread -17.28 -19.07 -16.67 -47.52** -47.51** -44.24**
(13.75) (13.63) (13.40) (19.39) (19.41) (17.01)
Log(Bond Issue Amount) -0.046 -0.038 -0.052 -0.166 -0.166 -0.176
(0.058) (0.080) (0.105) (0.095) (0.095) (0.125)
Bond Coupon -0.008 -0.007  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.031*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.015)
Bond Callable  0.087  0.078  0.100  0.087  0.087  0.080
(0.061) (0.058) (0.095) (0.105) (0.105) (0.145)
Bond Putable  0.185  0.190  0.050  0.026  0.026 -0.071
(0.387) (0.396) (0.395) (0.505) (0.504) (0.490)
Bond Secured  0.317  0.567  1.564**  0.780  0.778  3.643****
(0.377) (0.353) (0.656) (0.975) (0.978) (0.295)
Bond Senior -0.200 -0.216 -0.191 -0.389 -0.389 -0.121
(0.250) (0.241) (0.173) (0.281) (0.281) (0.198)
Repurchase Size  0.178  0.191*  0.153** 0.200*  0.201*  0.212**
(0.122) (0.106) (0.064) (0.098) (0.094) (0.089)
Withdrawn Repurchase -0.510** -0.367* -0.288 -0.149 -0.147 -0.315
(0.223) (0.203) (0.212) (0.380) (0.379) (0.440)
Open Market Repurchase -0.064 -0.018 -0.071 -0.044 -0.043 -0.012
(0.162) (0.193) (0.313) (0.190) (0.192) (0.240)
Equity CAR  0.028*  0.028*  0.001  0.013
(0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014)
Intercept -2.955 -2.941  3.050  0.630  0.628 16.710***
(2.727) (3.023) (2.134) (1.937) (1.930) (3.413)
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Industry (2 Digit SIC) Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Firm Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4,212 4,179 4,211 2,898 2,898 2,898
Adjusted R²  0.077  0.080  0.155  0.088  0.088  0.200
Panel B: Individual Bond Returns
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Table 8 
Regressions Explaining Bond Returns around Seasoned Equity Offerings 
The dependent variables in Panel A are cash bond excess returns calculated as firm-aggregated price-weighted excess returns on the window [-5,+1] 
around the seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcement date.  Individual bonds are matched by short, intermediate, and long maturity sub-indices pf 
the Barclays investment grade and high yield indices respectively.  Additional controls include Market Capitalization, Excess Leverage, M/B Ratio, 
Lagged Equity Return, Implied Volatility, Tangibility, Dividend Yield, Operating Cash Flow Yield, E-Index, and CEO Options Compensation.  SEOs 
include all announced during the period 2002 to 2014 that are listed on the SDC Platinum database.  SEOs must be $1M or larger in value and represent 
0.5% of firm market equity value. Standard errors clustered on SEO year are reported in parentheses.  The symbols ****, ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
  
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)
S&P Credit Rating -0.147 -0.330* -0.531 -0.124 -0.327** -0.597
(0.145) (0.164) (0.389) (0.154) (0.126) (0.359)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) -0.690*** -0.727**** -1.039** -0.640*** -0.769*** -1.183***
(0.158) (0.114) (0.404) (0.127) (0.136) (0.383)
Log(Market Cap)  0.717*  0.873**  1.199*  0.726*  0.911**  1.413**
(0.353) (0.356) (0.640) (0.389) (0.352) (0.625)
Excess Leverage -2.463 -3.613 -8.774 -1.371 -3.203 -12.680*
(2.269) (2.313) (5.737) (2.126) (1.896)  (5.941)
Market/Book Ratio -0.040 -0.058  0.075 -0.066* -0.087  0.068
(0.041) (0.052) (0.081) (0.037) (0.067) (0.052)
Lagged Equity Return -0.003 -0.260 -0.339  0.026 -0.338 -0.416
(0.149) (0.314) (0.499) (0.190) (0.416) (0.537)
Implied Volatility  2.497  2.708  2.190  2.457  2.511  1.968
(1.497) (2.583) (3.050) (1.445) (2.670) (1.773)
Bond Maturity -0.102* -0.055 -0.065 -0.081** -0.008 -0.006
(0.050) (0.074) (0.078) (0.036) (0.056) (0.079)
SEO Size 16.12*** 18.35***  19.31* 17.49*** 20.27**** 23.91**
(5.10) (4.85) (10.01) (3.81) (3.52) (8.80)
Bonds Relative Bid-Ask Spread  46.57 124.80  212.90
(54.40) (94.92) (193.80)
Cov Ratio: Limited Debt  0.013 -0.658  0.366
(0.523) (0.614) (1.595)
Equity CAR  0.052  0.054  0.160**
(0.063) (0.051) (0.071)
Intercept -1.982 -0.872  3.714 -4.092** -1.451 -1.670
(1.293) (2.157) (4.747) (1.597) (3.122) (5.381)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (2 Digit SIC) Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Number of Observations 286 286 171 260 260 153
Adjusted R²  0.167  0.197  0.151  0.194  0.238  0.293
Panel A: Firm Aggregated Bond Returns
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Table 8 (Continued) 
Regressions Explaining Bond Returns around Seasoned Equity Offerings 
 
 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)
S&P Credit Rating -0.107* -0.111* -0.058 -0.344 -0.419*  0.166
(0.052) (0.057) (0.213) (0.208) (0.202) (0.255)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) -0.799**** -0.789**** -0.960*** -1.390*** -1.458*** -2.077****
(0.123) (0.135) (0.233) (0.324) (0.273) (0.284)
Bond Maturity  0.013  0.017  0.007  0.010  0.013  0.008
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.039) (0.040) (0.048)
Cov: Limited Debt -0.418 -0.252 -0.575  0.756  0.821 -0.294
(0.279) (0.402) (0.465) (0.687) (0.882)  (0.586)
Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread   3.895  12.820  19.100  50.870  72.600*   4.998
(24.990) (26.910) (28.330) (33.260) (37.940) (44.260)
Log(Bond Issue Amount) -0.002  0.002 -0.198  0.198  0.194  0.321
(0.198) (0.184) (0.260) (0.216) (0.223) (0.259)
Bond Coupon  0.010  0.019  0.020 -0.011  0.023 -0.126
(0.064) (0.068) (0.082) (0.059) (0.058)  (0.103)
Bond Callable -0.034  0.082 -0.167  0.132  0.298 -0.313
(0.350) (0.389) (0.225) (0.421) (0.541) (0.245)
Bond Putable -0.881 -0.813 -1.182 -1.683 -1.660 -2.382**
(0.692) (0.687) (0.681) (1.254) (1.398) (0.865)
Bond Secured -1.221 -0.941 -2.450 -2.581 -0.445  0.712
(1.063) (1.185) (1.692) (1.962) (1.214)  (0.817)
Bond Senior  0.022 -0.029 -0.091 -0.331 -0.260 -0.736
(0.441) (0.463) (0.646) (0.721) (0.655) (0.851)
SEO Size 18.040*** 17.900***  33.350**  28.930** 29.450*** 21.970****
(4.086) (4.048) (13.320) (11.080) (9.016) (2.652)
Equity CAR  0.038  0.101*  0.169***  0.219***
(0.035) (0.051) (0.049)  (0.061)
Intercept  2.975  3.266  10.400 -3.937 -2.502 -39.000
(4.884) (4.930) (7.088) (6.555) (7.020) (24.980)
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Industry (2 Digit SIC) Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Firm Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 573 573 573
Adjusted R²  0.178  0.181  0.310  0.310  0.344  0.545
Panel B: Individual Bond Returns
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Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics of CDS Spread and CDS-Bond Basis Changes: Acquisitions 
All results are presented in basis points on the [-5,+1] event window.  Prior to October 2003 (2007), investment grade (high yield) 5-year CDS spread 
excess changes are computed as the spread change in basis points over the event window minus the change in the investment grade (high yield) BofA 
Merrill Lynch US Corporate Spread obtained from the St. Louis Fed.  After October 2003 (2007), raw investment grade (high yield) CDS spread changes 
are adjusted by the spread change of the Markit CDX North American Investment Grade index (Markit CDX North American High Yield index).  The 
CDS-bond basis is firm-aggregate price-weighted and calculated as the difference between the interpolated (to individual bond maturity) CDS spread and 
the z-spread.  Z-spreads used in the basis credit ratio (BCR) are also price-weighted firm aggregates.  Unless specified, cross-sections are constructed using 
all relevant transactions. A firm is designated investment grade if the firm's S&P Rating is BBB- and higher and high yield if below BB- or unrated.  
Financials (Utilities) include firms with 6000 (4900) SIC codes.  The significance level of the median is determined using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  The 
significance level of the difference in medians is determined using a Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.  The symbols ****, ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  †††, ††, and † denote significant differences in cross-sectional non-parametric 
tests at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
All Acquisitions 0.902 0.757 ** 516 0.191 0.609 * 427 0.868 -0.511 *** 334
Primary Sample 0.902 0.757 ** 516 0.116 0.590 * 396 0.868 -0.511 *** 334
CDS-Bond Subsample 1.092 0.720 * 428 -0.879 0.544 304 1.007 -0.483 242
2002-2006 1.245 0.742 ** 161 1.214 0.449 80 -2.898 -0.569 ** 78
2007-2009 -0.285 -1.074 123 ††† 0.456 0.953 141 -1.483 -0.556 ** 123
2010-2014 1.293 1.518 *** 232 †† -0.388 0.365 206 5.250 -0.349 133
Investment Grade 1.717 *** 1.000 *** 435 0.692 0.538 * 331 2.161 -0.570 * 256
High Yield -3.473 -0.437 81 -1.538 1.518 96 -3.378 -0.270 ** 78
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old 0.523 0.333 247 0.991 0.248 191 -3.639 -0.556 * 145
S&P Rating Greater than Two Weeks Old 1.660 1.250 ** 251 -0.620 1.129 ** 228 4.587 -0.483 * 180
Predominantly Discount Bonds 1.220 0.062 57 0.835 1.490 92 -4.706 * -0.440 * 78
Predominantly Premium Bonds 0.862 1.000 ** 459 0.014 0.482 335 2.566 -0.561 ** 256
Below Median CDS Spread 0.637 1.000 * 264 -2.687 0.029 174 5.205 -0.443 144
Above Median CDS Spread 0.897 0.495 248 2.120 1.775 ** 165 -0.796 -0.569 ** 115
Below Median Bond Bid-Ask Spread 0.824 0.488 158 1.920 1.474 * 140 2.125 -0.325 195
Above Median Bond Bid-Ask Spread 1.250 0.868 * 270 -0.647 0.381 286 -0.910 -0.622 **** 138
Below Median Bond Trade Volume 1.754 0.470 148 -0.026 0.205 169 3.062 -0.570 122
Above Median Bond Trade Volume 2.290 ** 1.155 * 152 -2.053 0.605 182 0.839 -0.307 136
Below Median CDS Bid-Ask Spread 1.120 0.474 253 1.736 1.158 ** 186 †† 1.128 -0.542 * 132
Above Median CDS Bid-Ask Spread 1.235 1.000 * 255 -2.954 0.028 151 4.038 -0.519 126
No Bank Debt 2.401 ** 0.710 * 329 2.196 * 0.687 263 -3.542 * -0.675 *** 201 ††
Has Bank Debt -1.174 1.155 180 -3.319 0.544 160 7.786 * -0.032 129
Industrial Firms 0.954 0.750 * 382 -1.466 0.461 309 4.572 * -0.386 240
Financials and Utilities 0.753 0.809 134 4.529 * 1.594 ** 118 †† -8.589 ** -0.769 *** 94 ††
Cash Payment Only 1.215 1.140 ** 227 †† 0.448 0.588 205 0.632 -0.349 167 †
Stock Payment Only -0.655 -0.188 178 1.822 1.537 * 137 2.647 -0.593 106
Private Targets -0.542 0.500 337 -0.226 0.841 279 2.975 -0.450 * 203
Public Targets 3.621 * 1.336 ** 179 † 0.977 0.332 148 -2.398 -0.616 ** 131
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
All Acquisitions -25.786 * -6.473 ** 45 -9.996 -2.633 43 -3.829 -0.468 34
Primary Sample -65.695 ** -40.714 *** 18 ††† -3.744 -0.376 21 -6.303 -0.528 18
CDS-Bond Subsample -59.445 ** -40.696 ** 15 †† -15.764 -7.256 16 -7.648 0.058 13
2002-2006 -6.230 -2.698 12 11.706 3.754 6 † -1.531 -0.904 ** 6
2007-2009 -50.600 -16.233 * 17 -7.675 -4.555 17 0.675 -0.031 17
2010-2014 -14.087 -6.937 16 -18.480 ** -13.157 ** 20 -12.042 -0.659 11
Investment Grade -21.277 -6.299 ** 28 -19.472 ** -14.239 ** 24 †† -7.860 -0.954 18
High Yield -33.211 -6.473 17 1.973 2.536 19 0.707 -0.164 16
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old -36.205 * -5.456 ** 18 -16.205 -2.465 20 1.031 0.052 17
S&P Rating Greater than Two Weeks Old -18.839 -6.473 27 -3.981 -1.752 22 -8.735 -0.468 ** 16
Panel A1: Acquisitions, Acquirer Firms
(2)  CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps)
Panel A2: Acquisitions, Target Firms
(1)  CDS Spread Change (bps)
(1)  CDS Spread Change (bps) (2)  CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps)
(3) Basis Credit Ratio
(3) Basis Credit Ratio
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Table 9 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics of CDS Spread and CDS-Bond Basis Changes: Common Equity Repurchases 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
All Repurchases -0.902 0.261 673 -2.334 *** -0.204 ** 536 1.133 -0.696 **** 423
Primary Sample -0.902 0.261 673 -2.497 *** -0.203 ** 511 1.133 -0.696 **** 423
CDS-Bond Subsample -0.714 0.292 595 -2.601 ** -0.167 ** 416 1.682 -0.730 *** 332
2002-2006 1.299 ** 0.438 ** 201 -1.059 0.013 85 8.600 -0.832 *** 82
2007-2009 -5.503 -0.483 174 † -3.433 0.216 168 -10.647 -0.702 **** 160
2010-2014 0.301 0.191 298 -2.065 ** -0.621 ** 283 8.165 -0.467 181
Investment Grade -0.449 0.199 566 -1.882 ** -0.007 440 8.361 -0.827 **** 354 †
High Yield -3.294 0.979 107 -4.409 * -1.202 * 96 -35.946 -0.442 69
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old -2.562 -0.015 294 -3.344 * -0.329 * 224 -11.454 -0.923 *** 165
S&P Rating Greater than Two Weeks Old 0.229 0.428 359 -1.862 * -0.205 * 297 9.567 -0.602 ** 245
Predominantly Discount Bonds -8.229 -0.351 84 -3.368 0.911 101 -28.118 -0.927 *** 92
Predominantly Premium Bonds 0.143 0.423 589 -2.094 *** -0.352 *** 435 9.264 -0.610 *** 331
Below Median CDS Spread 0.510 0.313 353 -0.702 0.230 224 8.153 -1.000 **** 196 †††
Above Median CDS Spread -2.349 0.025 316 -4.536 ** -1.235 *** 243 †† -7.037 -0.463 163
Below Median Bond Bid-Ask Spread 0.227 0.124 321 -1.865 ** -0.130 * 307 10.602 -0.884 *** 197
Above Median Bond Bid-Ask Spread -1.970 0.438 272 -2.963 -0.307 229 -7.120 -0.637 ** 226
Below Median Bond Trade Volume -0.898 -0.023 200 -1.383 -0.071 208 4.334 -0.622 ** 164
Above Median Bond Trade Volume 1.932 * 0.830 ** 228 †† -1.565 * 0.017 252 -0.905 -0.696 * 183
Below Median CDS Bid-Ask Spread -2.243 0.121 329 -4.472 *** -1.094 *** 258 † 8.852 -0.456 187
Above Median CDS Bid-Ask Spread 0.517 0.383 340 -0.413 0.216 208 -7.002 -1.003 **** 172 †††
No Bank Debt -1.551 0.270 390 -1.798 -0.068 304 2.573 -0.736 *** 256
Has Bank Debt 0.013 0.283 277 -3.083 *** -0.533 ** 230 -1.047 -0.647 * 165
Industrial Firms 0.067 0.210 529 -1.791 ** -0.068 * 425 -0.493 -0.640 *** 329
Financials and Utilities -4.459 0.410 144 -4.412 -0.610 ** 111 6.826 -0.832 *** 94
(1)  CDS Spread Change (bps) (3) Basis Credit Ratio(2)  CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps)
Panel B: Repurchases
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Table 9 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics of CDS Spread and CDS-Bond Basis Changes: Seasoned Equity Offerings 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
All SEOs -16.602 ** -2.906 *** 153 -0.396 -1.623 124 2.341 -0.509 83
Primary Sample -16.602 ** -2.906 *** 153 -1.584 -1.852 115 2.341 -0.509 83
CDS-Bond Subsample -20.103 ** -2.026 ** 105 -17.250 ** -1.852 ** 71 † 0.266 -0.268 48
2002-2006 -2.604 -2.334 * 36 -2.178 -1.399 19 10.816 -0.710 18
2007-2009 -15.936 -5.046 ** 58 10.073 -1.129 49 -0.267 -0.430 * 43
2010-2014 -25.798 * -3.089 *** 59 -8.952 -1.850 56 0.506 -0.358 22
Investment Grade -8.663 ** -1.654 ** 116 -3.411 -1.852 79 -0.303 -0.931 ** 53 †
High Yield -41.493 -28.833 ** 37 4.896 -1.234 45 7.014 -0.173 30
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old -15.119 -2.097 ** 86 6.846 -1.623 64 -2.508 -0.716 41
S&P Rating Greater than Two Weeks Old -19.226 ** -4.500 ** 45 -9.433 -1.949 57 7.433 -0.428 40
Predominantly Discount Bonds -36.259 -17.262 * 41 1.850 -0.825 57 -0.773 -0.357 46
Predominantly Premium Bonds -9.406 -2.584 *** 112 -2.307 -1.852 67 6.213 -0.619 37
Below Median CDS Spread 0.991 -1.456 74 -3.006 -1.847 37 2.520 -0.754 24
Above Median CDS Spread -33.082 ** -17.857 *** 79 ††† -18.707 * -3.538 53 -1.691 -0.215 34
Below Median Bond Bid-Ask Spread -16.199 -2.667 * 63 -6.133 -1.399 73 5.317 -0.455 38
Above Median Bond Bid-Ask Spread -27.638 ** -1.732 40 8.020 -1.543 50 -0.171 -0.619 45
Below Median Bond Trade Volume -30.689 -1.524 34 -14.990 -1.949 47 -0.520 -0.099 26
Above Median Bond Trade Volume -16.221 -2.883 ** 41 -4.230 -1.129 53 6.594 -0.268 34
Below Median CDS Bid-Ask Spread -33.157 *** -11.057 *** 85 ††† -15.664 -1.092 55 1.977 0.099 36
Above Median CDS Bid-Ask Spread 4.091 -0.944 68 -6.283 -2.431 34 -3.196 * -1.156 ** 21 †
No Bank Debt -24.698 * -4.584 *** 81 -12.808 -1.901 60 3.433 -0.524 38
Has Bank Debt -7.494 -1.654 72 11.240 -1.264 64 1.420 -0.509 45
Industrial Firms -7.943 -1.609 70 5.551 -1.541 60 5.470 -0.147 37
Financials and Utilities -23.904 ** -3.931 *** 83 -5.971 -1.626 64 -0.175 -0.816 ** 46
Panel C: SEOs
(1)  CDS Spread Change (bps) (2)  CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps) (3) Basis Credit Ratio
 
 83 
Table 10 
Regressions Explaining Changes in Credit Spreads around Acquisitions 
The dependent variables in acquirer excess CDS and firm-aggregated z-spread changes respectively on the window [-5,+1] around the acquisition 
announcement date.  Prior to October 2003 (2007), investment grade (high yield) 5-year CDS spread excess changes are computed as the spread change in 
basis points over the event window minus the change in the investment grade (high yield) BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate Spread obtained from the St. 
Louis Fed.  After October 2003 (2007), raw investment grade (high yield) CDS spread changes are adjusted by the spread change of the Markit CDX 
North American Investment Grade index (Markit CDX North American High Yield index).  Z-spreads are price-weighted firm aggregates adjusted by the 
BofA ML US IG/HY spreads throughout the 2002-2014 sample.  Standard errors clustered on acquisition year are reported in parentheses.  The symbols 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)
Log(CDS Spread)  0.000  0.481 -0.294  0.795
(1.611) (2.834) (3.433) (1.965)
S&P Credit Rating -2.227 -1.792 -1.412 -2.286
(1.851) (2.299) (2.231) (2.053)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) -2.106 -2.822 -2.655 -2.110
(3.074) (2.527) (2.470) (2.752)
Log(Market Cap)  0.415 -0.024 -0.217  0.404  7.523  5.964  5.513  8.639
(1.348) (1.359) (1.508) (1.943) (7.756) (7.853) (7.432) (8.202)
Excess Leverage -0.158 -3.048  0.119  9.300  -4.054  -6.793  21.090 -0.886
(8.746) (8.378) (11.230) (10.100) (10.670) (10.020) (15.810) (9.829)
Market/Book Ratio -0.220 -0.214 -0.212 -0.151 -0.138 -0.465 -0.651  0.291
(0.247) (0.245) (0.263) (0.272) (0.577) (0.376) (0.410) (0.679)
Implied Volatility   1.36   8.90  13.67 -20.60 -38.33 -29.83 -32.16 -40.01***
(11.75) (12.91) (13.71) (18.83) (27.49) (28.56) (29.07) (11.16)
Bond Maturity  0.051  0.028  0.007  0.025 -0.073  0.008  0.055  0.363
(0.154) (0.118) (0.120) (0.107) (0.502) (0.239) (0.329) (0.688)
Bond Premium/Discount  28.28  16.15  38.62 -32.02
(53.96) (71.81) (53.53) (76.53)
Relative Size (Target/Acquirer)  8.899  2.927  3.012  1.293 18.040* 15.540* 13.570 12.770
(10.930) (9.561) (9.875) (8.284) (9.241) (8.235) (8.663) (8.160)
Cash Percentage of Payment  0.844 -0.157 -0.732  1.507  5.615  2.503  1.092  2.805
(2.997) (3.951) (4.318) (3.789) (4.865) (4.396) (4.310) (5.478)
Same Industry Dummy (3 Digit SIC)  2.717  3.965  3.433  3.752 10.33*  9.578  8.538  0.749
(2.787) (2.519) (2.748) (2.164) (5.521) (5.532) (4.876) (2.798)
Withdrawn Deal  9.218*  8.331  7.971 10.45* -27.05 -17.79  -7.64 -23.87
(5.041) (6.332) (6.344) (5.326) (23.20) (16.88) (14.99) (27.63)
Private Target -2.009 -4.592 -5.208 -0.944  3.319 -0.860 -2.908  2.558
(2.208) (4.425) (4.492) (4.050) (5.925) (4.772) (6.153) (4.413)
Private Target × Cash Percentage  6.665  8.194  1.758  21.97  29.37   7.62
(9.091) (9.184) (9.430) (20.48) (24.96) (17.54)
Cov Ratio: Merger Restrictive  2.109 -0.012  0.518  13.520  20.260  22.620
(3.578) (3.034) (3.937) (17.800) (18.920) (26.180)
CDS or Bonds Relative Bid-Ask Spread -5.607   1.641 -10.48 -1,986.5 -1,810.3 -1,315.3
(14.470) (13.820) (14.49) (1520.5) (1347.3) (1188.3)
Acquirer Equity CAR -0.793* -0.807* -0.103 -0.460 -0.349 -0.352
(0.426) (0.440) (0.227) (0.373) (0.345) (0.284)
Intercept  -8.937  -0.812   0.832 161.20*** -17.14 -13.87 -22.88 -56.41
(16.360) (18.620) (24.410) (31.88) (45.47) (35.16) (41.15) (55.92)
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Industry (2 Digit SIC) Fixed EffectsNo No No Yes No No No Yes
Number of Observations 387 380 380 380 406 400 400 400
Adjusted R²  0.026  0.085  0.070  0.211  0.031  0.051  0.077  0.164
Acquirer 5-Year CDS Spread Excess Change Acquirer Aggregated Bond Z-Spread Excess Change
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Table 11 
Regressions Explaining Changes in Credit Spreads around Common Equity Repurchases 
The dependent variables in excess CDS and firm-aggregated z-spread changes respectively on the window [-5,+1] around the repurchase announcement 
date.  Prior to October 2003 (2007), investment grade (high yield) 5-year CDS spread excess changes are computed as the spread change in basis points 
over the event window minus the change in the investment grade (high yield) BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate Spread obtained from the St. Louis Fed.  
After October 2003 (2007), raw investment grade (high yield) CDS spread changes are adjusted by the spread change of the Markit CDX North American 
Investment Grade index (Markit CDX North American High Yield index).  Z-spreads are price-weighted firm aggregates adjusted by the BofA ML US 
IG/HY spreads throughout the 2002-2014 sample.  Standard errors clustered on repurchase year are reported in parentheses.  The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)
Log(CDS Spread) -2.507 -0.203 -3.694
(3.454) (3.364) (3.656)
S&P Credit Rating  1.359  1.435  1.739
(0.986) (0.944) (0.959)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age)  5.783**  6.158**  5.166**
(2.017) (2.115) (1.883)
Log(Market Cap) -3.163* -2.956 -5.121 -0.946 -0.762 -1.540
(1.748) (1.663) (2.982) (2.095) (2.040) (1.248)
Excess Leverage -14.240 -7.569 -8.164   3.383   2.166   1.361
(13.870) (17.940) (15.710) (13.210) (10.540) (19.480)
Market/Book Ratio -0.185 -0.079  0.415  0.153  0.162  0.619
(0.255) (0.233) (0.313) (0.152) (0.157) (0.349)
Lagged Equity Return  3.993  3.554  2.867 -0.094  0.116  0.552
(3.871) (4.000) (3.642) (0.519) (0.657) (0.600)
Implied Volatility -180.1 -190.7 -238.9*  14.20  15.23  20.58
(105.2) (115.4) (121.4) (20.07) (21.08) (20.13)
Bond Maturity -0.467 -0.443 -0.540*  0.001 -0.034 -0.228
(0.295) (0.261) (0.290) (0.132) (0.151) (0.215)
Bond Premium/Discount  14.22   4.14  24.92
(24.21) (37.60) (20.18)
Repurchase Size  1.051  1.982 -0.380 -0.771 -0.545 -8.114
(1.823) (2.450) (2.216) (1.783) (1.922) (5.608)
Withdrawn Repurchase 18.39* 16.22 25.25* -10.35 -10.35  -8.45
(9.66) (9.54) (12.20) (14.42) (14.23) (11.63)
Open Market Repurchase 13.350 15.420* 15.470*  7.656*  6.275  6.949***
(7.753) (8.466) (8.098) (3.579) (3.400) (1.966)
CDS or Bonds Relative Bid-Ask Spread -11.94 -10.10 -10.65  2,338.4  2,303.1  1,442.2
(20.02) (20.61) (23.49) (1992.9) (2048.2) (1355.6)
Cov Ratio: Payout Policy  8.845  7.011 15.070 11.330 10.860 10.730
(9.879) (8.914) (9.310) (7.224) (8.071) (9.368)
Equity CAR -0.010  0.049 -0.030 -1.213 -1.199 -1.393
(0.406) (0.399) (0.417) (0.661) (0.658) (0.856)
Intercept  49.29  33.89  71.67 -57.69* -53.47 -127.40*
(39.94) (34.43) (52.42) (30.82) (33.29)  (61.89)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry (2 Digit SIC) Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Number of Observations 526 526 526 480 480 480
Adjusted R²  0.266  0.263  0.309  0.088  0.081  0.137
5-Year CDS Spread Excess Change Aggregated Bonds Z-Spread Excess Change
 
 85 
Table 12 
Regressions Explaining Changes in Credit Spreads around Seasoned Equity Offerings 
The dependent variables in excess CDS and firm-aggregated Z-spread changes respectively on the window [-5,+1] around the SEO announcement date.  
Prior to October 2003 (2007), investment grade (high yield) 5-year CDS spread excess changes are computed as the spread change in basis points over the 
event window minus the change in the investment grade (high yield) BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate Spread obtained from the St. Louis Fed.  After 
October 2003 (2007), raw investment grade (high yield) CDS spread changes are adjusted by the spread change of the Markit CDX North American 
Investment Grade index (Markit CDX North American High Yield index).  Z-spreads are price-weighted firm aggregates adjusted by the BofA ML US 
IG/HY spreads throughout the 2002-2014 sample.  Standard errors clustered on SEO year are reported in parentheses.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)
Log(CDS Spread) -14.120 -20.240 -2.247
(14.310) (15.840) (6.330)
S&P Credit Rating  5.541  4.706  2.865
(3.977) (3.779) (1.781)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age)  6.734*  6.918* 19.830**
(3.440) (3.517) (7.585)
Log(Market Cap) -6.708 -7.418 -13.580 -15.62 -15.94 -14.60**
(7.803) (9.338)  (8.245) (11.77) (12.30) (5.63)
Excess Leverage  52.61  69.94  -21.14  96.66 106.50 126.60*
(46.03) (48.27) (107.10) (59.56) (62.11) (65.84)
Market/Book Ratio -0.806 -0.564 -2.515***  1.263  1.898  1.469
(1.165) (1.067) (0.801) (1.633) (2.068) (2.924)
Lagged Equity Return  -9.277   8.331   8.588 -1.418 -1.399  3.904
(14.360) (18.970) (27.280) (1.771) (3.437) (3.883)
Implied Volatility -103.1*** -108.4*** -125.1** -26.53 -29.89 -48.92
 (30.6)  (23.6)  (53.3) (22.94) (24.70) (51.21)
Bond Maturity  0.935  0.629  1.506 -0.578 -0.611 -4.750*
(0.733) (0.748) (0.977) (1.032) (1.412) (2.154)
Bond Premium/Discount 132.7** 181.0** 151.8
(47.6) (72.3) (95.6)
SEO Size -207.2 -220.8 -392.1*** -212.6* -244.3** -198.8*
(138.0) (128.6)  (79.0)  (99.1) (101.5)  (92.0)
CDS or Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread   82.65   82.08   9.66 -3770.7** -3306.5** -9271.4***
(171.80) (199.90) (87.69) (1173.3) (1327.5) (2734.0)
Cov Ratio: Limited Debt  -0.802  -4.301 -29.630  -0.265  -3.713   2.585
(23.040) (29.580) (24.630) (13.640) (15.140) (20.000)
Equity CAR -4.966**** -5.047**** -4.991****  1.552*  1.529*  0.953
(0.415) (0.578) (0.729) (0.722) (0.718) (0.708)
Intercept  131.80  149.80  82.51  31.16  29.03   82.31
(135.60) (148.60) (98.44) (49.21) (39.65) (119.10)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (2 Digit SIC) Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Number of Observations 94 94 94 128 128 128
Adjusted R² 0.728 0.709 0.837 0.260 0.224 0.231
5-Year CDS Spread Excess Change Aggregated Bonds Z-Spread Excess Change
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Table 13 
Regressions Explaining Changes in the CDS-Bond Basis around Corporate Events 
The dependent variables in OLS regression specifications are changes in CDS-bond basis on the window [-5,+1] around the transaction announcement 
date.   The CDS-bond basis is obtained from Bloomberg and calculated as the difference between the interpolated (to individual bond maturity) CDS 
spread and the z-spread.   Pooled sample specifications include acquirer observations with indicator variables for repurchases and SEOs respectively.  
Standard errors clustered on transaction year are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
  
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)
Transaction Size -4.961 -6.187 -15.780 -16.720  1.400  0.976 -266.4 -399.7****
(7.494) (7.880) (17.830) (17.010) (0.895) (0.732) (169.6)  (30.1)
Bond Bid-Ask Spread -1686.4 -1215.1* -2116.1*** -1367.4** -2620.3* -1104.4 -2090.4  -944.5
 (946.6)  (625.5)  (477.5)  (586.1) (1155.5) (1236.8) (4772.4) (2524.4)
CDS Bid-Ask Spread  1151.4 1142.7 1340.5  747.1  1815.5   347.7  -780.1  -712.4
(1212.6) (793.2) (771.1) (840.4) (1204.7) (1022.0) (7534.2) (8478.5)
Bond × CDS Bid-Ask Spread  8.836  8.701  9.870  5.591 13.970  2.683  -6.375  -6.685
(9.211) (5.986) (5.711) (6.291) (9.235) (7.720) (58.050) (66.070)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age)  0.869  0.190 -0.096 -0.540  1.486  0.197  5.900  6.247
(1.284) (0.854) (2.203) (1.816) (1.301) (0.568) (5.862) (5.392)
Log(CDS Spread) -3.592 -3.287  9.311 -1.491 -7.597 -1.238  -0.471  -8.143
(2.405) (1.858) (5.278) (4.937) (5.144) (1.098) (10.830) (18.180)
Asset Tangibility -2.784 10.370 -2.712 -79.60**
(1.994) (5.894) (2.439) (32.17)
Excess Leverage  26.150  37.930   5.272 -55.49
(25.000) (24.120) (13.500) (105.80)
Log(Market Capitalization) -1.181 -4.249  0.128 -12.52
(1.652) (3.862) (0.870) (10.53)
Financial Firm -1.627  3.953  0.634   0.943
(6.020) (5.273) (1.052) (14.560)
Premium/Discount  40.03*  35.96 -2.134   90.33
(17.63) (31.35) (9.300) (125.10)
Bond Maturity  0.358 -0.226  0.204  3.876**
(0.280) (0.235) (0.129) (1.674)
Transaction Covenant Ratio  4.181 -3.511 -10.89  45.51**
 (6.259) (4.618)  (9.81) (14.49)
Intercept 19.460*  20.90 -29.85  52.64  33.35  9.552  10.54  130.6
(8.883) (21.90) (20.78) (55.10) (22.96) (10.310) (67.46) (142.3)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 821 749 298 277 438 400 85 72
Adjusted R²  0.024  0.031  0.014 -0.013  0.103  0.079  0.135  0.405
Acquirers Repurchases SEOsPooled Sample
Panel A: Firm Aggegated CDS-Bond Basis Changes
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Table 13 (Continued) 
Regressions Explaining Changes in the CDS-Bond Basis around Corporate Events  
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)
Transaction Size -7.250 -8.654 -30.28 -33.04**  1.543  3.274** -378.1*** -214.6
(9.255) (8.997) (18.42) (14.19) (0.986) (1.123)  (80.3) (183.2)
Bond Bid-Ask Spread  269.7 -256.4  271.7  908.6 402.9 -305.3  3133.5  9030.0**
(578.8) (726.1) (522.8) (536.3) (394.5) (526.7) (2060.1) (3258.4)
CDS Bid-Ask Spread  329.4    6.9 -165.2 -745.6 -117.40  203.00 -5134.2 -25690.4**
(633.2) (397.0) (590.1) (511.3) (249.70) (174.80) (2961.3)  (9171.6)
Bond × CDS Bid-Ask Spread  2.607  0.022 -1.134 -5.918 -0.866  1.393 -41.01 -196.90**
(4.772) (2.984) (4.552) (3.887) (1.879) (1.200) (23.40)  (70.89)
Log(S&P Credit Rating Age) -0.448  0.461  0.925  0.859 -0.180  1.575** -6.138  8.270
(0.738) (0.745) (1.677) (1.084) (0.665) (0.547) (5.403) (9.951)
Log(CDS Spread) -7.820*** -6.017 -4.828 -1.727 -3.467* -2.128** -37.11*  1.856
(2.159) (4.493) (4.299) (6.312) (1.621) (0.892) (17.22) (8.707)
Asset Tangibility -2.290 12.700* -2.723 -46.97
(3.808) (5.704) (3.781) (37.26)
Excess Leverage  24.00  48.62**  -1.41  -15.26
(13.92) (19.14) (11.42) (101.40)
Log(Market Capitalization) -1.377 -5.114**  0.285   2.708
(2.006) (1.909) (1.003) (18.290)
Financial Firm  2.506  3.846  4.386**  18.43
(6.893) (7.479) (1.415) (43.19)
Premium/Discount  28.40 -31.24 -21.29 -67.24*  -2.60 -70.29* -194.9 -138.0
(24.57) (31.94) (25.42) (36.05) (25.73) (34.47) (152.5) (261.2)
Bond Maturity  0.321  0.040 -0.750 -0.308  0.243 -0.147  2.273 -1.452
(0.278) (0.233) (0.625) (0.512) (0.282) (0.229) (3.013) (2.861)
Transaction Covenant  3.663 -2.719  1.396  8.290 -10.500  2.433  25.83 -32.690***
(3.581) (4.698) (3.364) (6.537)  (6.612) (3.129) (21.17)  (6.538)
Log(Bond Issue Amount) -2.942***  0.409  0.921  0.717 -2.229 -0.732 -17.560** -6.012
(0.789) (1.721) (3.858) (4.406) (1.822) (2.506)  (7.119) (4.812)
Bond Age  0.051  0.228  0.510  0.499 -0.093  0.139  0.774 -1.715
(0.396) (0.224) (0.325) (0.343) (0.538) (0.358) (1.786) (1.045)
Bond Coupon -1.224  0.839 -2.449 -0.086  0.810  3.443**  12.430   8.736
(1.776) (1.481) (1.653) (1.835) (0.589) (1.187) (11.160) (15.870)
Bond Callable  1.448  4.845 -4.296 -0.858  1.005  0.317  15.24  44.46
(2.387) (4.581) (5.674) (4.225) (0.818) (1.413) (12.40) (30.07)
Bond Putable  11.00  6.201  17.33  13.77   2.854 11.130
(11.37) (6.965) (11.32) (10.55) (14.780) (7.638)
Bond Secured -28.09 -91.54*  47.09* -56.02  8.094  13.850 -59.280 -94.370
(37.95) (45.32) (22.55) (39.56) (5.802) (11.870) (55.970) (69.300)
Bond Senior -0.327 -0.968 -2.926 -3.958  8.679  6.760   9.675 -9.666
(4.326) (3.624) (2.078) (2.832) (6.800) (5.152) (13.930) (5.199)
Intercept 111.80***  98.84  51.49  88.88  47.35 -562.8****  346.4  49.74
(30.83) (76.17) (90.96) (73.61) (39.58) (42.59) (276.9) (93.31)
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,932 3,249 1,095 1,163 1,510 1,687 327 399
Adjusted R²  0.034  0.130  0.030  0.149  0.021  0.302  0.174  0.198
Panel B: Individual Bond CDS-Bond Basis Changes
Pooled Sample Acquirers Repurchases SEOs
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Appendix: Table 4A 
Descriptive Statistics of Bond Excess Returns around Corporate Events by Credit Rating 
Table 4A is an alternative specification of Table 4 using credit rating cross-sections.  Firm aggregated excess returns are formed on the window [-5,+1] and 
are displayed in percent.  Bond excess returns are the bond value weighted excess returns above the Barclays (formerly Lehman Brothers) investment 
grade and high yield indices respectively over the entire sample period.    Individual bonds are maturity benchmarked against short, intermediate, and 
long Barclays corporate investment grade and high yield indices.  The signficance level of the difference in medians is determined using a Wilcoxon rank-
sum  (Mann-Whitney) test.  The symbols ****, ***,**, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   †††,††, 
and † denote significant differences in cross-sectional non-parametric tests at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
  
S&P Credit Rating Mean Median N Mean Median N
AAA -0.232 -0.335 18 N/A N/A 0
AA 0.257 0.125 51 †† -0.485 -0.485 1
A -0.223 ** -0.396 **** 280 2.816 0.910 14
BBB -0.037 -0.231 *** 357 2.614 0.937 * 37
BB -0.332 ** -0.329 **** 216 2.137 *** 1.141 *** 28
B -0.454 *** -0.361 *** 109 1.061 * 0.899 ** 25
CCC -0.119 -0.834 3     N/A     N/A 0
CC     N/A     N/A 0     N/A     N/A 0
D 4.387 4.387 1 † 4.312 4.312 1
NR 0.149 0.078 140 ††† 0.198 0.001 14
S&P Credit Rating Mean Median N Mean Median N
AAA 0.877 0.016 14 0.113 0.113 1
AA 0.117 -0.312 50 -0.608 -0.698 4
A -0.285 *** -0.463 **** 354 -0.193 0.079 44
BBB -0.240 ** -0.347 **** 403 0.537 * 0.023 148
BB -0.197 -0.371 *** 180 -0.034 -0.044 88
B -0.311 0.136 30 0.399 -0.011 67
CCC -0.684 -0.684 1 4.930 ** 1.343 ** 20 †††
CC     N/A     N/A 0     N/A     N/A 0
D     N/A     N/A 0     N/A     N/A 0
NR -0.107 -0.200 * 99 1.062 ** 0.432 ** 64 †
(3) Repurchases (4) SEOs
(1) Acquirers (2) Targets
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Appendix: Table 9A 
Descriptive Statistics of CDS Spread & CDS-Bond Basis Changes by Credit Rating 
Table 9A is an alternative specification of Table 9 using credit rating cross-sections.  All results are presented in basis points on the [-5,+1] event window.  
Prior to October 2003 (2007), investment grade (high yield) 5-year CDS spread excess changes are computed as the spread change in basis points over the 
event window minus the change in the investment grade (high yield) BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate Spread obtained from the St. Louis Fed.  After 
October 2003 (2007), raw investment grade (high yield) CDS spread changes are adjusted by the spread change of the Markit CDX North American 
Investment Grade index (Markit CDX North American High Yield index).  The CDS-bond basis is firm aggregated and calculated as the difference 
between the interpolated (to individual bond maturity) CDS spread and the z-spread.  Z-spreads used in the basis credit ratio (BCR) are also price-
weighted firm aggregates.  The significance level of the difference in medians is determined using a Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.  The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  †††, ††, and † denote significant differences in cross-
sectional non-parametric tests at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
  
S&P Rating Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
AAA 10.831 5.712 6 6.212 2.533 10 -7.376 * -3.560 ** 10 ††
AA -1.949 0.015 38 -3.208 -0.811 29 †† -0.094 -0.211 29
A 0.729 1.189 * 178 -2.620 0.283 134 4.638 -0.483 109
BBB 2.939 *** 1.000 ** 213 3.867 * 1.984 ** 158 †† 1.150 -0.726 * 108
BB 5.603 0.146 43 -1.807 0.605 41 1.696 -0.132 36
B -18.267 9.577 12 6.295 5.540 10 0.378 0.011 8
CCC N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
CC N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
D N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
NR -11.656 ** -5.234 *** 26 ††† -3.034 1.055 45 -9.634 * -0.692 *** 34 †
S&P Rating Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
AAA -1.300 -3.042 9 -1.116 0.737 5 -15.527 -3.768 5
AA -2.000 -0.901 40 † -2.062 0.172 23 43.484 -1.113 22
A -1.679 0.426 230 -2.565 -0.122 178 5.605 -0.922 *** 154 †
BBB 0.779 0.187 287 -1.360 -0.046 234 7.038 -0.696 173
BB -4.351 2.974 72 -3.908 -2.025 * 56 † -70.342 -0.369 36
B -6.686 3.500 7 -15.823 -16.959 3 -0.841 -0.633 3
CCC N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
CC N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
D N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
NR 0.270 0.782 28 -4.241 -0.755 37 1.820 -0.496 30
S&P Rating Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
AAA -1.438 -1.438 1 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
AA -19.091 -17.857 3 -4.773 0.590 3 0.174 0.145 3
A -19.181 ** -1.866 * 36 -11.696 * -4.393 ** 18 -3.224 -0.701 16
BBB -3.363 -1.609 76 †† -0.769 -1.111 58 1.029 -0.984 * 34
BB -0.360 -11.995 11 -14.289 * -15.844 11 0.163 -0.435 8
B 34.404 -17.304 6 79.340 -1.399 11 0.873 -0.499 10
CCC -124.119 * -139.157 ** 13 ††† -53.654 2.097 8 1.641 1.641 2
CC N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
D N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
NR -17.736 -28.833 7 -4.400 -1.234 15 19.710 -0.005 10
Panel A: Acquisitions
(2)
CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps)
(1)
Excess CDS Spread Change (bps) Basis Credit Ratio
(3)
Panel C: SEOs
(1) (2)
Excess CDS Spread Change (bps) CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps)
(1) (2)
Excess CDS Spread Change (bps) CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps)
(3)
Basis Credit Ratio
Panel B: Repurchases
(3)
Basis Credit Ratio
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Appendix: Table 14 
Security Returns and Spread Changes Using Alternative Event Windows 
As in Table 4 and Table 9, excess bond returns, excess CDS spread changes, and CDS-bond basis changes are calculated on a [-1,+1] event window unless 
otherwise specified.  Results on [-15,+15] event windows must contain at least 15 days of bond prices.  The symbols ****, ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  †††, ††, and † denote significant differences in cross-sectional non-parametric tests at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
  
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
All Acquisitions (-15,+15) -0.843 **** -1.050 **** 863 5.176 *** 2.363 *** 448 1.078 -0.018 351
Primary Sample  (-15,+15) -0.141 *** -0.147 **** 604 1.398 0.326 415 -0.854 0.024 316
Bond-CDS Subsample  (-15,+15) -1.023 **** -1.193 **** 351 4.948 ** 2.434 *** 351 1.344 0.405 258
All Acquisitions -0.098 ** -0.138 **** 1,145 1.294 0.336 * 502 0.096 0.115 411
Primary Sample -0.141 *** -0.162 **** 805 †† 1.294 0.336 * 502 -0.055 0.097 381
Bond-CDS Subsample -0.244 **** -0.214 **** 419 1.230 * 0.368 ** 418 -0.676 -0.062 297 †
2002-2006 0.019 -0.094 ** 506 †† 0.932 0.312 * 157 0.561 -0.051 74
2007-2009 -0.139 -0.142 ** 257 -0.873 -0.570 * 119 ††† -1.225 0.110 134
2010-2014 -0.225 *** -0.216 **** 582 †† 2.687 ** 0.938 *** 226 †† 0.799 0.354 203
Investment Grade -0.093 -0.141 **** 668 1.296 ** 0.322 * 422 0.409 0.058 322
High Yield -0.105 * -0.119 *** 477 1.288 0.512 80 -1.036 0.796 89
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old -0.037 -0.117 * 506 1.393 0.002 241 -0.328 0.097 183
S&P Rating Greater than Two Weeks Old -0.136 ** -0.143 **** 606 1.318 0.771 ** 243 † 0.655 0.163 216
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
All Repurchases (-15,+15) -0.638 **** -0.668 **** 870 -0.738 0.518 579 -2.991 * -0.360 463
Primary Sample  (-15,+15) -0.568 **** -0.637 **** 715 -0.738 0.518 579 -3.262 ** -0.607 438
Bond-CDS Subsample  (-15,+15) -0.714 **** -0.749 **** 497 -1.057 0.227 497 -2.652 -0.226 564 ††
All Repurchases -0.094 ** -0.159 **** 1,080 1.049 ** 0.380 ** 655 -2.890 -0.376 558
Primary Sample -0.152 *** -0.170 **** 874 1.049 ** 0.380 ** 655 -0.416 0.111 498
Bond-CDS Subsample -0.179 *** -0.203 **** 582 †† 1.031 ** 0.417 *** 579 -0.633 -0.002 406
2002-2006 -0.104 * -0.127 **** 345 0.463 0.277 198 -1.108 -0.212 83
2007-2009 -0.002 -0.116 267 0.838 0.297 165 0.414 0.718 162 †
2010-2014 -0.140 ** -0.207 **** 468 1.567 ** 0.697 ** 292 -0.715 -0.164 278
Investment Grade -0.120 ** -0.181 **** 790 † 0.683 0.341 ** 554 -0.520 0.090 432
High Yield -0.025 -0.105 290 3.058 2.250 * 101 †† 0.010 0.447 91
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old 0.057 -0.136 440 0.281 0.070 285 -1.196 0.089 217
S&P Rating Greater than Two Weeks Old -0.182 *** -0.175 **** 602 †† 1.360 ** 0.622 * 350 0.094 0.115 291
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
All SEOs (-15,+15) 0.441 -0.305 293 -38.8818 *** -3.375 *** 136 1.025 -0.080 100
Primary Sample (-15,+15) 0.429 -0.084 * 188 -38.882 *** -3.375 *** 136 1.472 -0.045 94
Bond-CDS Subsample (-15,+15) 0.822 -0.245 89 -40.798 ** -3.000 ** 89 1.751 2.361 64
All SEOs 0.388 ** 0.020 402 -13.987 *** -3.054 **** 148 4.457 -0.026 140
Primary Sample 0.069 -0.017 241 -13.987 *** -3.054 **** 148 0.760 -1.009 109
Bond-CDS Subsample 0.094 -0.068 102 -14.772 *** -3.076 *** 101 -12.024 ** -1.009 * 67 †
2002-2006 0.205 0.006 162 -1.157 -1.702 * 36 -0.315 -1.236 19
2007-2009 0.756 0.166 * 112 -20.157 *** -8.421 *** 57 † -1.825 4.891 45
2010-2014 0.297 * -0.131 128 -15.991 * -1.545 ** 55 -3.184 0.110 53
Investment Grade 0.111 -0.043 180 -7.794 *** -2.000 *** 113 -7.258 ** -1.321 74
High Yield 0.612 *** 0.045 ** 222 -33.980 ** -17.696 ** 35 13.546 -0.337 41
S&P Rating Less Than Two Weeks Old 0.195 -0.013 195 -12.221 ** -1.764 *** 84 10.409 0.265 60
S&P Rating Greater than Two Weeks Old 0.633 ** 0.024 197 -16.635 ** -4.010 ** 60 -10.861 * -1.825 55
Panel A: Acquisitions, Acquirer Firms
(1)  Bond Return (%) (2)  CDS Spread Change (bps) (3)  CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps)
Panel B: Repurchases
(1)  Bond Return (%) (2)  CDS Spread Change (bps)
Panel C: SEOs
(1)  Bond Return (%) (2)  CDS Spread Change (bps)
(3)  CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps)
(3)  CDS-Bond Basis Change (bps)
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Appendix: Table 15 
Target Capital Structure Regressions 
The results of target capital structure time series regressions performed according to Uysal (2011) are reported below.  Regressions are calculated 
independently for firms conducting acquisitions (acquirers and targets), repurchases, and SEOs.  The predicted firm target leverage values derived from 
these coefficients are used to calculate excess leverage throughout my study.  Newey-West (1987) adjustment with three lags is used to calculate standard 
errors that are reported in parentheses.  ****, ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
(1a) (1b) (2) (3)
Salest-1  0.004 ****  0.004 **  0.005 ****  0.005 ****
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Market-to-Bookt-1 -0.000 -0.002 ** -0.000 *  0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
R&D Missing Dummyt-1  0.014 ****  0.014 ****  0.007 **  0.001
(0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005)
R&D/Total Assetst-1 -0.022 *** -0.031 -0.072 *** -0.011 *
(0.008) (0.024) (0.027) (0.006)
SG&A/Total Assetst-1 -0.000 -0.002 *  0.001 ***  0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
EBITDA/Total Assetst-1 -0.000 -0.030 ** -0.000 -0.004
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.004)
Tangible Assets/Total Assetst-1 -0.006  0.007 -0.005 -0.006
(0.007) (0.025) (0.009) (0.010)
Stock Returnt-1  0.000 *** -0.000  0.000  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Leveraget-1  0.638 ****  0.600 ****  0.667 ****  0.638 ****
(0.005) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008)
3-Digit SIC Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirers Repurchases SEOs
Dependent Variable: Market Leveraget
Targets
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable   Definition 
CDS Spread (bps)   Lagged five year Credit Default Swap spread before [-5,+1] event window, in basis points, obtained from Bloomberg 
CDS Bid-Ask Spread (bps)   Pre-event window bid-ask spread of quoted CDS spreads as a measure of firm CDS market liquidity 
CDS-Bond Basis (bps)   Pre-event window basis point difference between the interpolated (to individual bond Z-spread maturity) CDS spread and cash bond z-spread: CDS Bond Basist = CDS Spreadt − Bond Spreadt   
Number of Bond Issues   Number of distinct bond issues (regardless of issue size) for the firm at event date as provided by Bloomberg 
Z-Spread (bps)  Pre-event window price-weighted firm aggregate zero volatility (z-spread) in basis points as provided by Bloomberg.  For a bond with coupon 
frequency (f) and maturity (m), the z-spread (z) is the parallel shift to the risk-free swap curve (𝑟𝑡𝑖) which sets the bond invoice price to the 
present value of bond cash flows: Bond Invoice Price = ⎣⎢⎢⎡ � Couponti�1 + rti + zf �f×tiN=m×fi=1 ⎦⎥⎥⎤ + 1�1 + �rtn + z�f �f×tN 
Bond Coupon (%), Yield to 
Maturity (%), Premium / 
Discount, Age, Maturity, Duration 
  Price-weighted firm aggregated average of bond coupon (in %), yield to maturity (%), pre-event window premium (+) or discount (-), age 
since announcement (years), maturity (years), and duration (years) variables across firm bond issues obtained from Bloomberg.  Duration is 
winsorized at the 1% to calculate wealth changes presented in Figure 4 and Figure 5.  For each bond (q), all firm  (p) price-weighted aggregate 
bond characteristics and spreads (CS) are calculated as: CSp,(t−i,t+j) = � Bond CSp,q × Bond Valuep,q∑ BondValuep,rnr=1nq=1  
Bond Relative Bid-Ask Spread  Pre-event window ratio of average bid-ask spread over the average CDS spread midpoint as a measure of firm CDS market liquidity 
Bond Trade Volume   Traded bond volume as reported from dealers to Bloomberg over the event window as a firm's bond liquidity measure 
Callable, Putable, Secured, 
Senior Bonds Ratio 
  Price-weighted average (formula (A2) above) of bond characteristic indicator variables across transacting firm bond issues obtained from 
Bloomberg and taking values on [0,1] 
Cov Ratio: Limited Debt, Merger 
Restrictive. Payout Policy 
  Price-weighted average (formula (A2) above) of bond covenant indicator variables across transacting firm bond issues obtained from 
Bloomberg and taking values on [0,1] 
Bank Debt   Sum of term loans and revolvers over total debt obtained from Capital IQ 
Total Assets   Book value of firm assets, from the most recent accounting statement before the event window, obtained from Compustat and adjusted by the 
annual CPI deflator to 2014 dollars 
Market Cap   Equity market value of firm (in 2014 dollars) calculated as product of shares outstanding and share price, both obtained from CRSP, thirty 
days prior to the event date 
Leverage   Thirty day lagged ratio of the book value of debt over the sum of the book value of debt and the firm's market capitalization. Excess leverage 
is the difference between leverage and estimated target leverage calculated according to Uysal (2011) using Newey-West (1987) adjustment 
with three lags and 3-digit SIC code industry fixed effects.  Regression coefficients are provided in Table 15 of the appendix 
Implied Volatility   Thirty day lagged average implied volatility from the at-the-money put and call options contracts from OptionMetrics in excess of the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 index 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions (Continued) 
Variable   Definition 
Tangibility   Ratio of the sum of net property, plant and equipment and cash and short term investments over the firm's total assets 
Dividend, Operating Cash Flow 
Yield 
 Dividend and operating cash flows, obtained from Compustat, standardized by firm market capitalization 
S&P Credit Rating   Numerical translation, according to Odders-White and Ready (2006), of Standard and Poor's credit ratings obtained from Compustat.  AAA+ 
ratings receive a score of 36 while D ratings receive a score of 12 
InvGrade Rating   Indicator variable set to 1 if the firm's S&P Rating is BBB- (25) and 0 if BB- (24) or below 
S&P Credit Rating Age   Number of days since the rating was last updated or confirmed by Standard & Poor's 
E-Index   Corporate governance index calculated according to Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) using RiskMetrics data 
Market/Book Ratio  Market-to-book ratio of CRSP derived market capitalization and Compustat book value of equity.  This variable is winsorized at the 1% level 
and lagged thirty days 
CEO Options Compensation   The proportion of options based compensation in dollars relative to total compensation received by the firm's CEO according to Execucomp  
CEO Overconfidence   Indicator variable of high CEO optimism constructed from Execucomp data as per Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley 
(2011) 
Product Market Fluidity   Measure of product market competition from Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2014) obtained from the Hoberg and Phillips Data Library at 
the University of Maryland's Robert H. Smith School of Business.  At the time of this writing, observations for 2012-2014 are unavailable and 
are forward filled with 2011 entries 
Relative Deal Size, Repurchase 
Size, SEO Size 
  Ratio of transaction value from SDC Platinum over the thirty day lagged market capitalization of the transacting firm obtained from CRSP 
Cash Payment Percent   Percentage of deal value paid in cash by acquirer from SDC Platinum 
Private   Target indicator variable set to 1 if the target firm is privately held according to SDC Platinum 
Open Market Repurchase   Indicator variables for acquisition and common equity repurchase characteristics respectively according to SDC Platinum 
Deal, Repurchase Withdrawn   Indicator variable set to 1 if an acquisition or repurchase is eventually withdrawn according to SDC Platinum 
Additional Borrowing   Indicator variable set to 1 if repurchase financing requires additional borrowing according to SDC Platinum 
Equity/ Target CAR   Value-weighted, four factor Fama-French (1996) adjusted equity return for transacting and target firms respectively 
 
